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Distributed protocols such as Paxos play an important role in many computer systems. Therefore, a bug
in a distributed protocol may have tremendous effects. Accordingly, a lot of effort has been invested in
verifying such protocols. However, checking invariants of such protocols is undecidable and hard in practice,
as it requires reasoning about an unbounded number of nodes and messages. Moreover, protocol actions
and invariants involve both quantifier alternations and higher-order concepts such as set cardinalities and
arithmetic.
This paper makes a step towards automatic verification of such protocols. We aim at a technique that
can verify correct protocols and identify bugs in incorrect protocols. To this end, we develop a methodology
for deductive verification based on effectively propositional logic (EPR)—a decidable fragment of first-order
logic (also known as the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey class). In addition to decidability, EPR also enjoys
the finite model property, allowing to display violations as finite structures which are intuitive for users.
Our methodology involves modeling protocols using general (uninterpreted) first-order logic, and then
systematically transforming the model to obtain a model and an inductive invariant that are decidable to
check. The steps of the transformations are also mechanically checked, ensuring the soundness of the method.
We have used our methodology to verify the safety of Paxos, and several of its variants, including Multi-Paxos,
Vertical Paxos, Fast Paxos, Flexible Paxos and Stoppable Paxos. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first to verify these protocols using a decidable logic, and the first formal verification of Vertical Paxos, Fast
Paxos and Stoppable Paxos.
CCS Concepts: • Software and its engineering→ Formal methods; • Networks→ Protocol correctness;
• Theory of computation→ Logic and verification;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Paxos, safety verification, inductive invariants, deductive verification,
effectively propositional logic, distributed systems
1 INTRODUCTION
Paxos is a family of protocols for solving consensus in a network of unreliable processors with
unreliable communication. Consensus is the process of deciding on one result among a group of
participants. Paxos protocols play an important role in our daily life. For example, Google uses the
Paxos algorithm in their Chubby distributed lock service in order to keep replicas consistent in
case of failure [Burrows 2006]. VMware uses a Paxos-based protocol within the NSX Controller.
Amazon Web Services uses Paxos-like algorithms extensively to power its platform [Newcombe
et al. 2015]. The key safety property of Paxos is consistency: processors cannot decide on different
values.
Due to its importance, verifying the safety of distributed protocols like Paxos is an ongoing
research challenge. The systems and programming languages communities have had several recent
∗This is the full version of a paper presented in OOPLSA 2017 [Padon et al. 2017]. This version includes appendices that do
not appear in the conference proceedings, and a slightly improved model of Multi-Paxos.
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success stories in verifying the safety of Paxos-like protocols in projects such as IronFleet [Haw-
blitzel et al. 2015], Verdi [Wilcox et al. 2015], and PSync [Dragoi et al. 2016]1.
1.1 Main Results
This work aims to increase the level of automation in verification of distributed protocols, hoping
that it will eventually lead to wider adoption of formal verification in this domain. We follow
IronFleet, Verdi, and PSync, in requiring that the user supplies inductive invariants for the protocols.
We aim to automate the process of checking the inductiveness of the user-supplied invariants.
The goal is that the system can reliably produce in finite time either a proof that the invariant is
inductive or display a comprehensible counterexample to induction (CTI), i.e., a concrete transition
of the protocol from state s to state s ′ such that s satisfies the given invariant and s ′ does not2.
Such a task seems very difficult since these protocols are usually expressed in rich programming
languages in which automatically checking inductive invariants is both undecidable and very hard
in practice. In fact, in the IronFleet project, it was observed that undecidability of the reasoning
performed by Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner 2008] is a major hurdle in their verification process.
1.1.1 Criteria for Automatic Deductive Verification. We aim for an automated deductive verifica-
tion technique that achieves three goals:
Natural Making the invariants readable even for users who are not expert in the tools.
Completeness Making sure that if the invariant is inductive then the solver is guaranteed to
prove it.
Finite Counterexamples Guaranteeing that if the invariant is not inductive then the solver
can display a concrete counterexample to induction with a finite number of nodes which can
be diagnosed by users.
These goals are highly ambitious. Expressing the verification conditions in a decidable logic with
a small model property (e.g., EPR [Piskac et al. 2010]) will guarantee Completeness and Finite
Counterexamples. However, it is not clear how to model complex protocols like Paxos in such
logics. Consensus protocols such as Paxos often require higher-order reasoning about sets of
nodes (majority sets or quorums), combined with complex quantification. In fact, some researchers
conjectured that decidable logics are too restrictive to be useful.
Furthermore, we are aiming to obtain natural invariants. We decided to verify the designs
of the protocols and not their implementations since the invariants are more natural and since
we wanted to avoid dealing with low level implementation issues. In the future we plan to use
refinement to synthesize efficient low level implementations. Systems such as Alloy [Jackson
2006] and TLA [Lamport 2002] have already been used for finding bugs in protocols and inductive
invariants (e.g., by Amazon [Newcombe et al. 2015]). Again they verify and identify faults in the
designs and not the actual implementation. However, in contrast to our approach, they cannot
automatically produce proofs for inductiveness (Completeness).
1.1.2 A Reusable Verification Methodology. In this work, we develop a novel reusable verification
methodology based on Effectively Propositional logic (EPR) for achieving the above goals. Our
methodology allows the expression of complex protocols and systems, while guaranteeing that the
verification conditions are expressed in EPR. EPR provides both decidability and finite counterex-
amples, and is supported by existing solvers (e.g., Z3 [de Moura and Bjørner 2008], iProver [Korovin
2008], VAMPIRE [Riazanov and Voronkov 2002], CVC4 [Barrett et al. 2011]). We have used our
1IronFleet and PSync also verify certain liveness properties.
2Such a CTI indicates that there is a bug in the protocol itself, or that the provided invariant is inadequate (e.g., too weak or
too strong).
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methodology to verify the safety of Paxos, and several of its variants, including Multi-Paxos, Vertical
Paxos, Fast Paxos, Flexible Paxos and Stoppable Paxos. To the best of our knowledge, this work is
the first to verify these protocols using a decidable logic, and, in the case of Vertical Paxos, Fast
Paxos, and Stoppable Paxos, it is also the first mechanized safety proof.
We have also compared our methodology to a traditional approach based on a state-of-the-art
interactive theorem prover—Isabelle/HOL [Nipkow et al. 2002]. Our comparison shows that the
inductive invariants used are very similar in both approaches (Natural), and that our methodology
allows more reliable and predictable automation: an interactive theorem prover can discharge
proof obligations to theorem provers using undecidable theories, but these often fail due to the
undecidability. In such cases, it requires an experienced expert user to prove the inductive invariant.
In contrast, with our methodology all the verification conditions are decidable and therefore
checking them is fully automated.
First-order uninterpreted abstraction. The first phase in our verification process is expressing the
system and invariant in (undecidable) many-sorted first-order logic over uninterpreted structures.
This is in contrast to SMT which allows the use of interpreted theories such as arithmetic and the
theory of arrays. The use of theories is natural specifically for handling low level aspects such as
machine arithmetic and low level storage. However, SMT leads to inherent undecidability with
quantifiers which are used to model unbounded systems. In contrast to SMT, we handle concepts,
such as arithmetic and set cardinalities, using abstraction expressible in first-order logic, e.g., a
totally ordered set instead of the natural numbers. This involves coming up with domain knowledge
encoded as first-order axioms (e.g. a first-order formula expressing transitivity of a total order).
We are encouraged by the simplicity of our abstractions and the fact that they are precise enough
to prove complex protocols. We also note that using first-order logic has led us to axioms and
invariants that elegantly capture the essence of the protocols. This is also enabled by the fact that
we are modeling high-level protocols and not their low level implementations.
At the end of this phase, the verification conditions are in general first-order logic. This is already
useful as it allows to use resolution-based theorem provers (e.g., SPASS [Weidenbach et al. 2009]
and VAMPIRE [Riazanov and Voronkov 2002]). Yet, at this stage the verification conditions are still
undecidable, and solvers are not guaranteed to terminate.
One way to obtain decidability is to restrict quantifier alternations. We examine the quantifier
alternation graph of the verification condition, which connects sorts that alternate in ∀∃ quan-
tification. When this graph contains cycles, solvers such as Z3 often diverge into infinite loops
while instantiating quantifiers. This issue is avoided when the graph is acyclic, in which case
the verification condition is essentially in EPR. Therefore, the second phase of our methodology
provides a systematic way to soundly eliminate the cycles.
Eliminating quantifier alternations using derived relations. The most creative part in our method-
ology is adding derived relations and rewriting the code to break the cycles in the quantifier
alternation graph. The main idea is to capture an existential formula by a derived relation, and then
to use the derived relation as a substitute for the formula, both in the code and in the invariant,
thus eliminating some quantifier alternations. The user is responsible for defining the derived
relations and performing the rewrites. The system automatically generates update code for the
derived relations, and automatically checks the soundness of the rewrites. For the generation of
update code, we exploit the locality of updates, as relations (used for defining the derived relations)
are updated by inserting a single entry at a time. We identify a class of formulas for which this
automatic procedure is always possible and use this class for verifying the Paxos protocols.
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We are encouraged by the fact that the transformations needed in this step are reusable across
all Paxos variants we consider. Furthermore, the transformations maintain the simplicity and
readability of both the code and the inductive invariants.
1.2 Summary of the rest of the paper
In Section 2 we present the technical background on using first-order logic to express transition
systems, and on the EPR fragment. We then develop our general methodology for EPR-based
verification in Section 3. Section 4 reviews the Paxos consensus algorithm, which is the basis for all
Paxos-like protocols. We present our model of the Paxos consensus algorithm as a transition system
in first-order logic in Section 5, and continue to verify it using EPR by applying our methodology
in Section 6. In Section 7, we describe our verification of Multi-Paxos using EPR. We briefly discuss
the verification of Vertical Paxos, Fast Paxos, Flexible Paxos, and Stoppable Paxos in Section 8.
In Section 9 we report on our implementation and experimental evaluation. We discuss related
work in Section 10, and Section 11 concludes the paper. More details about the verification of
Vertical Paxos, Fast Paxos, Flexible Paxos, and Stoppable Paxos appear in Appendix A. Appendix B
contains a worked out comparison of the proof of Paxos using our methodology to a proof using
the Isabelle/HOL interactive proof assistant.
2 BACKGROUND: VERIFICATION USING EPR
In this section we present the necessary background on the formalization of transition systems
using first-order logic, as well as on the EPR fragment of first-order logic.
2.1 Transition Systems in First Order Logic
We model transition systems using many-sorted first-order logic. We use a vocabulary Σ which
consists of sorted constant symbols, function symbols and relation symbols to capture the state of
the system, and formulas to capture sets of states and transitions. Formally, given a vocabulary Σ, a
state is a first-order structure over Σ. We sometimes use axioms in the form of closed first-order
formulas over Σ, to restrict the set of states to those that satisfy all the axioms. A transition system
is a pair (INIT, TR), where INIT is the initial condition given by a closed formula over Σ, and TR is
the transition relation given by a closed formula over Σ ⊎ Σ′ where Σ is used to describe the source
state of the transition and Σ′ = {a′ | a ∈ Σ} is used to describe the target state. The set of initial
states and the set of transitions of the system consist of the states, respectively, pairs of states, that
satisfy INIT, respectively, TR. We define the set of reachable states of a transition system in the
usual way. A safety property is expressed by a closed formula P over Σ. The system is safe if all of
its reachable states satisfy P .
In the paper, we use the relational modeling language (RML) [Padon et al. 2016] to express
transition systems. An RML program consists of actions, each of which consists of a loop-free code
that is executed atomically, and corresponds to a single transition. RML commands include non-
deterministic choice, sequential composition, and updates to constant symbols, function symbols
and relation symbols (representing the system’s state), where updates are expressed by first-order
formulas. In addition, conditions in RML are expressed using assume commands. RML programs
naturally translate to formulas (INIT, TR), where TR is a disjunction of the transition relation
formulas associated with each action (see [Padon et al. 2016] for details of the translation). As such,
we will use models, programs and transition systems interchangeably throughout the paper. We
note that RML is Turing-complete, and remains so when INIT and TR are restricted to the EPR
fragment.
A closed first-order formula INV over Σ is an inductive invariant for a transition system (INIT, TR)
if INIT |= INV and INV ∧ TR |= INV′, where INV′ results from substituting every symbol in INV by
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its primed version. These requirements ensure that an inductive invariant represents a superset of
the reachable states. Given a safety property P , an inductive invariant INV proves that the transition
system is safe if INV |= P . Equivalently, INV proves safety of (INIT, TR) for P if the following
formulas are unsatisfiable: (i) INIT ∧ ¬INV, (ii) INV ∧ TR ∧ ¬INV′, and (iii) INV ∧ ¬P . We refer
to these formulas as the verification condition of INV. When INV ∧ TR ∧ ¬INV′ is satisfiable, and
(s, s ′) |= INV ∧ TR ∧ ¬INV′, we say that the transition (s, s ′) is a counterexample to induction (CTI).
2.2 Extended Effectively Propositional Logic (EPR)
The effectively-propositional (EPR) fragment of first-order logic, also known as the Bernays-
Schönfinkel-Ramsey class is restricted to relational first-order formulas (i.e., formulas over a
vocabulary that contains constant symbols and relation symbols but no function symbols) with a
quantifier prefix ∃∗∀∗ in prenex normal form. Satisfiability of EPR formulas is decidable [Lewis
1980]. Moreover, formulas in this fragment enjoy the finite model property, meaning that a satisfiable
formula is guaranteed to have a finite model. The size of this model is bounded by the total number
of existential quantifiers and constants in the formula. The reason for this is that given an ∃∗∀∗-
formula, we can obtain an equi-satisfiable quantifier-free formula by Skolemization, i.e., replacing
the existentially quantified variables by constants, and then instantiating the universal quantifiers
for all constants. While EPR does not allow any function symbols nor quantifier alternation except
∃∗∀∗, it can be easily extended to allow stratified function symbols and quantifier alternation (as
formalized below). The extension maintains both the finite model property and the decidability of
the satisfiability problem.
The quantifier alternation graph. Let φ be a formula in negation normal form over a many-sorted
signature Σ with a set of sorts S. We define the quantifier alternation graph of φ as a directed graph
where the set of vertices is the set of sorts, S, and the set of directed edges, called ∀∃ edges, is
defined as follows.
• Function edges: let f be a function in φ from sorts s1, . . . , sk to sort s . Then there is a ∀∃
edge from si to s for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k .
• Quantifier edges: let ∃x : s be an existential quantifier that resides in the scope of the
universal quantifiers ∀x1 : s1, . . . ,∀xk : sk in φ. Then there is a ∀∃ edge from si to s for every
1 ≤ i ≤ k .
Intuitively, the quantifier edges correspond to the edges that would arise as function edges if
Skolemization is applied.
Extended EPR. A formula φ is stratified if its quantifier alternation graph is acyclic. The extended
EPR fragment consists of all stratified formulas. This fragment maintains the finite model property
and the decidability of EPR. The reason for this is that, after Skolemization, the vocabulary of a
stratified formula can only generate a finite set of ground terms. This allows complete instantiation
of the universal quantifiers in the Skolemized formula, as in EPR. In the sequel, whenever we say a
formula is in EPR, we refer to the extended EPR fragment.
3 METHODOLOGY FOR DECIDABLE VERIFICATION
In this section we explain the general methodology that we follow in our efforts to verify Paxos
using decidable reasoning. While this paper focuses on Paxos and its variant, the methodology is
more general and can be useful for verifying other systems as well.
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3.1 Modeling in Uninterpreted First-Order Logic
The first step in our verification methodology is to express the protocol as a transition system in
many-sorted uninterpreted first-order logic. This step involves some abstraction, since protocols
usually employ concepts that are not directly expressible in uninterpreted first-order logic.
3.1.1 Axiomatizing Interpreted Domains. One of the challenges we face is modeling an inter-
preted domain using uninterpreted first-order logic. Distributed algorithms often use values from
interpreted domains, the most common example being the natural numbers. These domains are
usually not precisely expressible in uninterpreted first order logic.
To express an interpreted domain, such as the natural numbers, in uninterpreted first-order
logic, we add a sort that represents elements of the interpreted domain, and uninterpreted symbols
to represent the interpreted symbols (e.g. a ≤ binary relation). We capture part of the intended
interpretation of the symbols by introducing axioms to the model. The axioms are a finite set of
first-order logic formulas that are valid in the interpreted domain. By adding them to the model, we
allow the proof of verification conditions to rely on these axioms. By using only axioms that are
valid in the interpreted domain, we guarantee that any invariant proved for the first-order model is
also valid for the actual system.
∀x . x ≤ x
∀x ,y, z. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z
∀x ,y. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x → x = y
∀x ,y. x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x
Fig. 1. Axiomatization of total order.
One important example for axioms expressible in first-order
logic is the axiomatization of total orders. In many cases, nat-
ural numbers are used as a way to enforce a total order on a
set of elements. In such cases, we can add a binary relation ≤,
along with the axioms listed in Fig. 1, which precisely capture
the properties of a total order.
3.1.2 Expressing Higher-Order Logic. Another hurdle to using first-order logic is the fact that
algorithms and their invariants often use sets and functions as first class values, e.g. by quantifying
over them, sending them in a message, etc. Consider an algorithm in which messages contain a set
of nodes as one of the message fields. Then, the set of messages sent so far (which may be part of
the state of the system) is a set of tuples, where one of the elements in the tuples is itself a set of
nodes. Similarly, messages may contain maps, which are naturally modeled by functions (e.g., a
message may contain a map from nodes to values). In such cases, the invariants needed to prove
the algorithms will usually include higher-order quantification.
While higher-order logic cannot be fully reduced to first-order logic, it is well-known that we
can partly express high-order concepts in first-order logic in the following way.
Sets. Suppose we want to express quantification over sets of nodes. We add a new sort called
nodeset, and a binary relation member : node, nodeset. We then use member(n, s) instead of n ∈ s ,
and express quantification over sets of nodes as quantification over nodeset. Typically, we will
need to add first-order assumptions or axioms to correctly express the algorithm and to prove its
inductive invariant. For example, the algorithm may set s to the empty set as part of a transition.
We can translate this in the transition relation using ∀x : node.¬member(x , s ′) (where s ′ is the
value of s after the transition).
Functions. Functions can be encoded as first-order elements in a similar way. Suppose messages
in the algorithm contain a map from nodes to values. In this case, we can add a new first-order
sort called map, and a function symbol apply : map, node→ value. Then, we can use apply(m,n)
instead ofm(n), and replace quantification over functions with quantification of the first-order
sort map. As before, we may need to add axioms that capture some of the intended second-order
meaning of the sort map.
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Verification Using EPR
Fig. 2. Flow chart of the methodology for verification using EPR. User provided inputs are depicted as
rectangles, automated procedures are depicted as hexagons, and automatically generated outputs are depicted
as ellipses. The original first-order logic modelM = (INIT, TR), and the original (first-order logic) inductive
invariant INV result in a quantifier alternation graph, which guides the process. The transformation to EPR is
carried in steps 1-4, detailed in Section 3.2. In step 1, the user provides definitions for derived relations. In step
2, update code is automatically generated, resulting inMu = (INITu , TRu ). In step 3, the user provides rewrites
that use the derived relations, as well as an auxiliary inductive invariant to prove the soundness of the rewrites.
An automated procedure first checks the soundness of the rewrites (and provides a counterexample in case
they are unsound, or a counterexample to induction if the auxiliary inductive invariant is not inductive), and
then outputs the transformed model M̂ = (ÎNIT, T̂R). In step 4, the user provides an inductive invariant ÎNV
that proves safety of the transformed model, and an automated check either verifies the inductiveness or
provides a counterexample to induction.
While this encoding is sound (as long as we only use axioms that are valid in the higher-order
interpretation), it cannot be made complete due to the limitation of first-order logic. However, we
did not experience this incompleteness to be a practical hurdle for verification in first-order logic.
3.1.3 Semi-Bounded Verification. Given a transition system in first-order logic with a candidate
inductive invariant, it may still be undecidable to check the resulting verification condition. However,
bounded verification is decidable, and extremely useful for debugging the model before continuing
with the efforts of unbounded verification. Contrary to the usual practice of bounding the number of
elements in each sort for bounded verification, we use the quantifier alternation graph to determine
only a subset of the sorts to bound in order to make verification decidable. We call this procedure
semi-bounded verification, and it follows from the observation that whenever we make a sort
bounded, we can remove its node from the quantifier alternation graph. When the resulting graph
becomes acyclic, satisfiability is decidable without bounding the sizes of the remaining sorts.
3.2 Transformation to EPR Using Derived Relations
The second step in our methodology for decidable unbounded verification is to transform the
model expressed in first-order logic to a model that has an inductive invariant whose verification
condition is in EPR, and is therefore decidable to check. The methodology is manual, but following
it ensures soundness of the verification process. The key idea is to use derived relations to simplify
the transition relation and the inductive invariant. Derived relations extend the state of the system
and are updated in its transitions. Derived relations are somewhat analogous to ghost variables.
However there are two key differences. First, derived relations are typically not used to record the
history of an execution. Instead, they capture properties of the current state in a way that facilitates
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verification using EPR. Second, derived relations are not only updated in the transitions, but can
also affect them.
The transformation of the model using derived relations is conducted in steps, as detailed below.
The various steps are depicted in Fig. 2. The inputs provided by the user are depicted by rectangles,
while the automated procedures are depicted as hexagons, and their outputs are depicted as ellipses.
As illustrated by the figure, the user is guided by the quantifier alternation graph of the verification
conditions.
In the sequel, we fix a model over a vocabulary Σ and let INIT and TR denote its initial condition
and transition relation, respectively.
(1) Defining a derived relation. In the first, and most creative part of the process, the user identifies
an existentially quantified formulaψ (x¯) that will be captured by a derived relation r (x¯). The selection
ofψ is guided by the quantifier alternation graph of the verification condition, with the purpose of
eliminating cycles it contains. Quantifier alternations in the verification condition originate both
from the model and the inductive invariant. As we shall see, using r will allow us to eliminate some
quantifier alternations. As an example for demonstrating the next steps, consider a program defined
with a binary relation p, and let r (x) be a derived relation capturing the formulaψ (x) = ∃y.p(x ,y).
(2) Trackingψ by r . This step automatically extends the model into a model (INITu , TRu ) over
vocabulary Σ̂ = Σ∪ {r } which makes the same transitions as before, but also updates r to captureψ .
Formally, the transformed model (INITu , TRu ) over Σ̂ is obtained by adding: (i) an initial condition
that initializes r , and (ii) update code that modifies r whenever the relations mentioned in ψ are
modified. The initial condition and update code are automatically generated in a way that guarantees
that the following formula is an invariant of (INITu , TRu ):
∀x¯ . r (x¯) ↔ ψ (x¯). (1)
We call this invariant the representation invariant of r . Our scheme for automatically obtaining
(INITu , TRu ) and the class of formulasψ that it supports, are discussed in Section 3.3. In our example,
suppose that initially p is empty. Then, the resulting model would initialize r to be empty as well.
For an action that inserts a pair (a,b) to p, the resulting model would contain update code that
inserts a to r .
(3) Rewriting the transitions using r . In this step, the user exploits r to eliminate quantifier
alternations in the verification condition by rewriting the system’s transitions, obtaining a model
(ÎNIT, T̂R) defined over Σ̂. The idea is to rewrite the transitions in a way that ensures that the
reachable states are unchanged, while eliminating quantifier alternations. This is done by rewriting
some program conditions used in assume commands in the code (e.g., to use r instead ofψ , but
other rewrites are also possible). The vocabulary of the model does not change further in this step,
nor does the initial condition (i.e., ÎNIT = INITu ).
While the rewrites are performed by the user, we automatically check that the effect of the
modified commands on the reachable states remains the same (under the assumption of the
representation invariant). Suppose the user rewrites assume φ to assume φ̂. The simplest way
to ensure this has the same effect on the reachable states is to check that the following rewrite
condition is valid: φ ↔ φ̂ [ψ (x¯) / r (x¯)]. This condition guarantees that the two formulas φ and φ̂ are
equivalent in any reachable state, due to the representation invariant. In some cases, the rewrite is
such that φ̂ [ψ (x¯) / r (x¯)] is syntactically identical to φ, which makes the rewrite condition trivial.
However, to allow greater flexibility in rewriting the code, we allow using an EPR check to verify
the rewrite condition, and also relax the condition given above in two ways. First, we observe
that it suffices to verify the equivalence of subformulas of φ that were modified by the rewrite.
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Formally, if φ is syntactically identical to φ̂
[
θ1(y¯1) / θ̂1(y¯1), . . . ,θk (y¯k ) / θ̂k (y¯k )
]
, then to establish
the rewrite condition, it suffices to prove that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k the following equivalence is valid:
θi ↔ θ̂i [ψ (x¯) / r (x¯)]. (The case where φ was completely modified is captured by the case where
k = 1, φ = θ1 and φ̂ = θ̂1.) Second, and more importantly, recall that we are only interested in
preserving the transitions from reachable states of the system. Thus, we allow the user to provide
an auxiliary invariant INVaux (by default INVaux = true) which is used to prove that the reachable
transitions remain unchanged after the transformation. Technically, this is done by automatically
checking that
(i) INVaux is an inductive invariant of (INIT, TR), and
(ii) the following rewrite condition holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k :
INVaux ∧ д |= θi ↔ θ̂i [ψ (x¯) / r (x¯)], (2)
where д captures additional conditions that guard the modified assume command (д is auto-
matically computed from the program).
These conditions guarantee that the two formulas φ and φ̂ are equivalent whenever the modified
assume command is executed. To ensure that these checks can be done automatically, we require
that the corresponding formulas are in EPR. We note that verifying INVaux for (INIT, TR) can be
possible in EPR even in cases where verifying safety of (INIT, TR) is not in EPR, since INVaux can
be weaker (and contain less quantifier alternations) than an invariant that proves safety.
In our example, suppose the program contains the command assume ∃y.p(a,y). Then we
could rewrite it to assume r (a). For a more sophisticated example, suppose that the program
contains the command assume ∃y.p(a,y) ∧ q(a,y), and suppose this command is guarded by
the condition u(a) (i.e., the assume only happens if u(a) holds). Suppose further that we can
verify that INVaux = ∀x ,y.u(x) ∧ p(x ,y) → q(x ,y) is an invariant of the original system. Then we
could rewrite the assume command as assume r (a) since (∀x ,y.u(x) ∧ p(x ,y) → q(x ,y)) ∧u(a) |=
(∃y.p(a,y) ∧ q(a,y)) ↔ ∃y.p(a,y).
(4) Providing an inductive invariant. Finally, the user proves the safety of the transformed model
(ÎNIT, T̂R) by providing an inductive invariant ÎNV for it, whose verification condition will be in
EPR. Usually this is composed of: (i) Using r in the inductive invariant as a substitute to usingψ .
The point here is that usingψ would introduce quantifier alternations, and using r instead avoids
them. In our example, the safety proof might require the property that ∀x .u(x) → ∃y.p(x ,y),
and using r we can express this as ∀x .u(x) → r (x). (ii) Letting the inductive invariant express
some properties that are implied by the representation invariant. Note that expressing the full
representation invariant would typically introduce quantifier alternations that break stratification.
However, some properties implied by it may still be expressible while keeping the verification
condition in EPR. In our example, we may add ∀x ,y.p(x ,y) → r (x) to the inductive invariant. Note
that adding ∀x . r (x) → ∃y.p(x ,y) to the inductive invariant would make the verification condition
outside of EPR.
Given (ÎNIT, T̂R) and ÎNV, we can now automatically derive the verification conditions in EPR
and check that they hold. The following theorem summarizes the soundness of the approach:
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness). Let (INIT, TR) be a model over vocabulary Σ, and P be a safety property
over Σ. If (ÎNIT, T̂R) is a model obtained by the above procedure, and ÎNV is an inductive invariant for
it such that ÎNV |= P , then P holds in all reachable states of (INIT, TR).
Proof Sketch. Let B = {(s, sˆ) | s ∈ R ∧ sˆ ∈ Rˆ ∧ sˆ |Σ = s}, where R and Rˆ denote the reachable
states of (INIT, TR) and (ÎNIT, T̂R) respectively, and sˆ |Σ denotes the projection of a state sˆ (defined
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over Σ̂) to Σ. Steps 2 and 3 of the transformation above ensure that B is a bisimulation relation
between (INIT, TR) and (ÎNIT, T̂R), i.e., every transition possible in the reachable states of one of
these systems has a corresponding transition in the other. This ensures that (ÎNIT, T̂R) has the
same reachable states as (INIT, TR), up to the addition of relation r . Therefore, any safety property
expressed over Σ which is verified to hold in (ÎNIT, T̂R) also holds in (INIT, TR). □
As shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the transformed model (ÎNIT, T̂R) is bisimilar to the
original model. While this ensures that both are equivalent w.r.t. to the safety property, note that
we check safety by checking inductiveness of a candidate invariant. Unlike safety, inductiveness is
not necessarily preserved by the transformation. Namely, given a candidate inductive invariant
ÎNV which is not inductive for (ÎNIT, T̂R), the counterexample to induction cannot in general be
transformed to the original model, as it might depend on the derived relations and the rewritten
assume commands. An example of this phenomenon appears in Section 6.2.
Using the methodology. Our description above explains a final successful verification using the
proposed methodology. As always, obtaining this involves a series of attempts, where in each
attempt the user provides the verification inputs, and gets a counterexample. Each counterexample
guides the user to modify the verification inputs, until eventually verification is achieved. As
depicted in Fig. 2, with the EPR verification methodology, the user provides 5 inputs, and could
obtain 3 kinds of counterexamples. The inputs are the model, the derived relations, the rewrites, the
auxiliary invariant for proving the soundness of the rewrites, and finally the inductive invariant for
the resulting model. The possible counterexamples are either a counterexample to inductiveness
(CTI) for the auxiliary invariant and the original model, or a counterexample to the soundness of
the rewrite itself, or a CTI for the inductive invariant of the transformed model. After obtaining any
of the 3 kinds of counterexamples, the user can modify any one of the 5 inputs. For example, a CTI
for the inductive invariant of the transformed model may be eliminated by changing the inductive
invariant itself, but it may also be overcome by an additional rewrite, which in turn requires an
auxiliary invariant for its soundness proof. Indeed, we shall see an example of this in Section 6.2.
The task of managing the inter-dependence between the 5 verification inputs may seem daunting,
and indeed it requires some expertise and creativity from the user. This is expected, since the inputs
from the user reduce the undecidable problem of safety verification to decidable EPR checks. This
burden on the user is eased by the fact that for every input, the user always obtains an answer from
the system, either in the form of successful verification, or in the form of a finite counterexample,
which is displayed graphically and guides the user towards the solution. Furthermore, our experience
shows that most of the creative effort is reusable across similar protocols. In the verification of all
the variants of Paxos we consider in this work, we use the same two derived relations and very
similar rewrites (as explained in Sections 6 and 8).
Incompleteness of EPR verification. While the transformation using a given set of derived relations
and rewrites results in a bisimilar transition system, the methodology for EPR verification is not
complete. This is expected, as there can be no complete proof system for safety in a formalism
that is Turing-complete. For the EPR verification methodology, the incompleteness can arise from
several sources. It may happen that after applying the transformation, the resulting transition
system, while safe, cannot be verified with an inductive invariant that results in EPR verification
conditions. Another potential source for incompleteness is our requirement that the rewrites should
also be verified in EPR. It can be the case that a certain (sound) rewrite leads to a system that can
be verified using EPR, but the soundness of the rewrite itself cannot be verified using EPR. Another
potential source of incompleteness can be the inability to express sufficiently powerful axioms
about the underlying domain. We note that the three mentioned issues interact with each other, as
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it may be the case that a certain axiom is expressible in first-order logic, but it happens to introduce
a quantifier alternation cycle, when considered together with either the inductive invariant or the
verification conditions for the rewrites.
We consider developing a proof-theoretic understanding of which systems can and cannot be
verified using EPR to be an intriguing direction for future investigation. We are encouraged by the
fact that in practice, the proposed methodology has proven itself to be powerful enough to verify
Paxos and its variants considered in this work.
Multiple derived relations. For simplicity, the description above considered a single derived
relation. In practice, we usually add multiple derived relations, where each one captures a different
formula. The methodology remains the same, and each derived relation allows us to transform
the model and eliminate more quantifier alternations, until the resulting model can be verified
in EPR. In this case, the resulting inductive invariant may include properties implied by the
representation invariants of several relations and relate them directly. For example, suppose we add
the following derived relations: r1(x) defined byψ1(x) = ∃y.p(x ,y), and r2(x) defined byψ2(x) =
∃y, z.p(x ,y) ∧ p(y, z). Then, the inductive invariant may include the property: ∀x . r2(x) → r1(x).
Overapproximating the reachable states. Our methodology ensures that the transformed model
is bisimilar to the original model. It is possible to generalize our methodology and only require
that the modified model simulates the original model, which maintains soundness. This may allow
more flexibility both in the update code and in the manual rewrites performed by the user.
3.3 Automatic Generation of Update Code
In this subsection, we describe a rather naïve scheme for automatic generation of initial condition
and update code for derived relations, which suffices for verification of the Paxos variants considered
in this paper.We refer the reader to, e.g., [Paige and Koenig 1982; Reps et al. 2010], for more advanced
techniques for generation of update code for derived relations.
We limit the formulaψ (x¯) which defines a derived relation r (x¯) to have the following form:
ψ (x1, . . . ,xn) = ∃y1, . . . ,ym . φ(x1, . . . ,xn ,y1, . . . ,ym) ∧ p(xi1 , . . . ,xik ,y1, . . . ,ym)
whereφ is a quantifier-free formula,p is a relation symbol and xi j ∈ {x1, . . . ,xn} for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k .
Note that p occurs positively, and that it depends on some (possibly none) of the variables xi and
all of the variables yi . Our scheme further requires that the relations appearing in φ are never
modified, and that p is initially empty and only updated by inserting a single tuple at a time3.
Since p is initially empty, the initial condition for r (x¯) is that it is empty as well, i.e.:
∀x1, . . . ,xn . ¬r (x1, . . . ,xn).
The only updates allowed for p are insertions of a single tuple by a command of the form:
p(xi1 , . . . ,xik ,y1, . . . ,ym) := p(xi1 , . . . ,xik ,y1, . . . ,ym) ∨
(
k∧
j=1
xi j = aj ∧
m∧
j=1
yj = bj
)
.
For such an update, we generate the following update for r (x¯):
r (x1, . . . ,xn) := r (x1, . . . ,xn) ∨
(
φ(x1, . . . ,xn ,b1, . . . ,bm) ∧
k∧
j=1
xi j = aj
)
.
3These restrictions can be relaxed, e.g., to support removal of a single tuple or addition of multiple tuples. However, such
updates were not needed for verification of the protocols considered in this paper, so for simplicity of the presentation we
do not handle them.
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Notice that the update code translates to a purely universally quantified formula, sinceφ is quantifier-
free, so it does not introduce any quantifier alternations.
Lemma 3.2. The above scheme results in a model which maintains the representation invariant:
∀x¯ . r (x¯) ↔ ψ (x¯).
Proof Sketch. The representation invariant is an inductive invariant of the resulting model. Ini-
tiation is trivial, since bothp and r are initially empty. Consecution follows from the following, which
is valid in first-order logic: (∀x¯ .r (x¯) ↔ ψ (x¯)) ∧ (∀w¯, y¯.p ′(w¯, y¯) ↔ p(w¯, y¯) ∨ (w¯ = a¯ ∧ y¯ = b¯)) ∧(
∀x¯ .r ′(x¯) ↔ r (x¯) ∨
(
φ(x¯ , b¯) ∧∧kj=1 xi j = aj )) |= (∀x¯ .r ′(x¯) ↔ ψ ′(x¯)). □
4 INTRODUCTION TO PAXOS
A popular approach for implementing distributed systems is state-machine replication (SMR)
[Schneider 1990], where a (virtual) centralized sequential state machine is replicated across many
nodes (processors), providing fault-tolerance and exposing to its clients the familiar semantics of
a centralized state machine. SMR can be thought of as repeatedly agreeing on a command to be
executed next by the state machine, where each time agreement is obtained by solving a consensus
problem. In the consensus problem, a set of nodes each propose a value and then reach agreement
on a single proposal.
The Paxos family of protocols is widely used in practice for implementing SMR. Its core is the
Paxos consensus algorithm [Lamport 1998, 2001]. A Paxos-based SMR implementation executes a
sequence of Paxos consensus instances, with various optimizations. The rest of this section explains
the Paxos consensus algorithm (whose verification in EPR we discuss in Sections 5 and 6). We
return to the broader context of SMR in Section 8.
Setting. We consider a fixed set of nodes, which operate asynchronously and communicate
by message passing, where every node can send a message to every node. Messages can be lost,
duplicated, and reordered, but they are never corrupted. Nodes can fail by stopping, but otherwise
faithfully execute their algorithm. A stop failure of a node can be captured by a loss of all messages
to and from this node. Nodes must solve the consensus problem: each node has a value to propose
and all nodes must eventually decide on a unique value among the proposals.
Paxos consensus algorithm. We assume that nodes in the Paxos consensus algorithm can all
propose values, vote for values, and learn about decisions. The algorithm operates in a sequence of
numbered rounds in which nodes can participate. At any given time, different nodes may operate
in different rounds, and a node stops participating in a round once it started participating in a
higher round. Each round is associated with a single node that is the owner of that round. This
association from rounds to nodes is static and known to all nodes.
Every round represents a possibility for its owner to propose a value to the other nodes and
get it decided on by having a quorum of the nodes vote for it in the round. Quorums are sets of
nodes such that any two quorums intersect (e.g., sets consisting of a strict majority of the nodes).
To avoid the algorithm being blocked by the stop failure of a node which made a proposal, any
node can start one of its rounds and make a new proposal in it at any time (in particular, when
other rounds are still active) by executing the following two phases:
phase 1. The owner p of round r starts the round by communicating with the other nodes to
have a majority of them join round r , and to determine which values are choosable in lower
rounds than r , i.e., values that might have or can still be decided in rounds lower than r .
phase 2. If a value v is choosable in r ′ < r , in order not to contradict a potential decision in
r ′, node p proposes v in round r . If no value is choosable in any r ′ < r , then p proposes a
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value of its choice in round r . If a majority of nodes vote in round r for p’s proposal, then it
becomes decided.
Note that it is possible for different values to be proposed in different rounds, and also for several
decisions to be made in different rounds. Safety is guaranteed by the fact that (by definition of
choosable) a value can be decided in a round r ′ < r only if it is choosable in r ′, and that if a value v
is choosable in round r ′ < r , then a node proposing in r will only propose v . The latter relies on
the property that choosable values from prior rounds cannot be missed. Next, we describe in more
detail what messages the nodes exchange and how a node makes sure not to miss any choosable
value from prior rounds.
Phase 1a: The owner p of round r sends a “start-round” message, requesting all nodes to join
round r .
Phase 1b: Upon receiving a request to join round r , a node will only join if it has not yet joined a
higher round. If it agrees to join, it will respond with a “join-acknowledgment” message that will
also contain its maximal vote so far, i.e., its vote in the highest round prior to r , or ⊥ if no such
vote exists. By sending the join-acknowledgment message, the node promises that it will not join
or vote in any round smaller than r .
Phase 2a: Afterp receives join-acknowledgment messages from a quorum of the nodes, it proposes
a value v for round r by sending a “propose” message to all nodes. Node p selects the value v
by taking the maximal vote reported by the nodes in their join-acknowledgment messages, i.e.,
the value that was voted for in the highest round prior to r by any of the nodes whose join-
acknowledgment messages formed the quorum. As we will see, only this value can be choosable in
any r ′ < r out of all proposals from lower rounds. If all of these nodes report they have not voted
in any prior round, then p may propose any value.
Phase 2b: Upon receiving a propose message proposing value v for round r , a node will ignore
it if it already joined a round higher than r , and otherwise it will vote for it, by sending a vote
message to all nodes. Whenever a quorum of nodes vote for a value in some round, this value is
considered to be decided. Nodes learn this by observing the vote messages.
Note that a node can successfully start a new round or get a value decided only if at least one
quorum of nodes is responsive. When quorums are taken to be sets consisting of a strict majority
of the nodes, this means Paxos tolerates the failure of at most ⌊n/2⌋ nodes, where n is the total
number of nodes. Moreover, Paxos may be caught in a live-lock if nodes keep starting new rounds
before any value has a chance to be decided on.
5 PAXOS IN FIRST-ORDER LOGIC
The first step of our verification methodology is to model the Paxos consensus algorithm as a
transition system in many-sorted first-order logic over uninterpreted domains. This section explains
our model, listed in Fig. 3, as well as its safety proof via an inductive invariant.
5.1 Model of the Protocol
Our model of Paxos involves some abstraction. Since each round r has a unique owner that will
exclusively propose in r , we abstract away the owner node and treat the round itself as the proposer.
We also abstract the mechanism by which nodes receive the values up for proposal, and allow them
to propose arbitrary values.
Additional abstractions are needed as some aspects of the protocol cannot be fully expressed
in uninterpreted first-order logic. One such aspect is the fact that round numbers are integers, as
arithmetic cannot be fully captured in first-order logic. Another aspect which must be abstracted is
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1 sort node, quorum, round, value
2
3 relation ≤ : round, round
4 axiom total_order(≤)
5 constant ⊥ : round
6
7 relation member : node, quorum
8 axiom ∀q1, q2 : quorum. ∃n : node.member(n, q1) ∧member(n, q2)
9
10 relation start_round_msg : round
11 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
12 relation propose_msg : round, value
13 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
14 relation decision : node, round, value
15
16 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
17 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
18 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
19 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
20 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
21
22 action start_round(r : round) {
23 assume r , ⊥
24 start_round_msg(r) := true
25 }
26 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
27 assume r , ⊥
28 assume start_round_msg(r)
29 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
30 # find maximal round in which n voted, and the corresponding vote.
31 # maxr = ⊥ and v is arbitrary when n never voted.
32 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
33 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v) := true
34 }
35 action propose(r : round, q : quorum) {
36 assume r , ⊥
37 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
38 # 1b from quorum q
39 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → ∃r ′, v . join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v)
40 # find the maximal round in which a node in the quorum reported
41 # voting, and the corresponding vote.
42 # v is arbitrary if the nodes reported not voting.
43 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n . member(n, q)
44 ∧join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥}
45 propose_msg(r, v) := true # propose value v
46 }
47 action vote(n : node, r : round, v : value) {
48 assume r , ⊥
49 assume propose_msg(r, v)
50 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
51 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
52 }
53 action learn(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : quorum) {
54 assume r , ⊥
55 # 2b from quorum q
56 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v)
57 decision(n, r, v) := true
58 }
Fig. 3. Model of Paxos consensus algorithm as a
transition system in many-sorted first-order logic.
Fig. 4. Quantifier alternation graph for EPR
model of Paxos. The graph is obtained for the
model of Fig. 5, and the inductive invariant
given by the conjunction of eqs. (4) to (10)
and (13) to (15). The ∀∃ edges come from:
(i) the quorum axiom (Fig. 3 line 8) - edge
from quorum to node; (ii) eq. (7) – edges from
round and value to quorum, and an edge from
quorum to node (from the negation of the in-
ductive invariant in the VC); and (iii) eq. (13) –
edges from round, value and quorum to node.
1 relation left_round : node, round
2 relation joined_round : node, round
3
4 init ∀n, r . ¬left_round(n, r )
5 init ∀n, r . ¬joined_round(n, r )
6
7 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
8 assume r , ⊥
9 assume start_round_msg(r)
10 assume ¬left_round(n, r ) # rewritten
11 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) |
12 vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
13 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v) := true
14 # generated update code for derived relations:
15 left_round(n, R) := left_round(n, R) ∨ R < r
16 joined_round(n, r) := true
17 }
18 action propose(r : round, q : quorum) {
19 assume r , ⊥
20 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
21 # rewritten to aviod quantifier alternation
22 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → joined_round(n, r)
23 # rewritten to use vote_msg instead of join_ack_msg
24 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n . member(n, q)
25 ∧vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
26 propose_msg(r, v) := true
27 }
28 action vote(n : node, r : round, v : value) {
29 assume r , ⊥
30 assume propose_msg(r, v)
31 assume ¬left_round(n, r) # rewritten
32 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
33 }
Fig. 5. Changes to the Paxos model that allow
verification in EPR. Declarations that appear in
Fig. 3 are omitted, as well as the learn action
which is left unmodified.
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the use of sets of nodes as quantification over sets is also beyond first-order logic. We model these
aspects according to the principles of Section 3.1:
Sorts and Axioms. We use the following four uninterpreted sorts: (i) node - to represent nodes of
the system, (ii) value - to represent the values subject to the consensus algorithm, (iii) round - to
model the rounds of Paxos, and (iv) quorum - to model sets of nodes with pairwise intersection in
a first-order abstraction. While nodes and values are naturally uninterpreted, the rounds and the
quorums are uninterpreted representations of interpreted concepts: integers and sets of nodes that
intersect pairwise, respectively. We express some features that come from the desired interpretation
using relations and axioms.
For rounds, we include a binary relation ≤, and axiomatize it to be a total order (Fig. 1). Our model
also includes a constant ⊥ of sort round, which represents a special round that is not considered an
actual round of the protocol, and instead serves as a special value used in the join-acknowledgment
(1b) message when a node has not yet voted for any value. Accordingly, any action assumes that
the round it involves is not ⊥.
The quorum sort is used to represent sets of nodes that contain strictly more than half of the
nodes. As explained in Section 3.1, we introduce a membership relation between nodes and quorums.
An important property for Paxos is that any two quorums intersect. We capture this with an axiom
in first-order logic (Fig. 3 line 8).
State. The state of the protocol consists of the set of messages the nodes have sent. We represent
these using relations, where each tuple in a relation corresponds to a single message. The relations
start_round_msg, join_ack_msg, propose_msg, vote_msg correspond to the 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b phases of
the algorithm, respectively. In modeling the algorithm, we assume all messages are sent to all nodes,
so the relations do not contain destination fields. Note that recording messages via relations (i.e.,
sets) is an abstraction of the network but it is consistent with the messaging model we assume, in
which messages may be lost, duplicated, and reordered. The decision relation captures the decisions
learned by the nodes.
Actions. The different atomic steps taken by the nodes in the protocol are modeled using actions.
The start_round action models phase 1a of the protocol, sending a start round message to all
nodes. The join_round action models the receipt of a start round message and the transmission of a
join-acknowledgment (1b) message. The propose action models the receipt of join-acknowledgment
(1b) messages from a quorum of nodes, and the transmission of a propose (2a) message which
proposes a value for a round. The vote action models the receipt of a propose (2a) message by
a node, and voting for a value by sending a vote (2b) message. Finally, the learn action models
learning a decision by node n, when it is voted for by a quorum of nodes.
In these actions, sending a message is expressed by inserting the corresponding tuple to the
corresponding relation. Different conditions (e.g., not joining a round if already joined higher round,
properly reporting the previous votes, or appropriately selecting the proposed value) are expressed
using assume statements. To prepare a join-acknowledgment message in join_round, as well as
to propose a value in propose, a node needs to compute the maximal vote (performed by it or
reported to it, respectively). This is done by a max operation (line 32 and line 44) which operates
with respect to the order on rounds, and returns the round ⊥ and an arbitrary value in case the
set is empty. The r ,v := max {(r ′,v ′) | φ(r ′,v ′)} operation is syntactic sugar for an assume of the
following formula:
(r = ⊥ ∧ ∀r ′,v ′. ¬φ(r ′,v ′)) ∨ (r , ⊥ ∧ φ(r ,v) ∧ ∀r ′,v ′. φ(r ′,v ′) → r ′ ≤ r ). (3)
Note that if φ is a purely existentially quantified formula, then eq. (3) is alternation-free.
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5.2 Inductive Invariant
The key safety property we wish to verify about Paxos is that only a single value can be decided
(it can be decided at multiple rounds, as long as it is the same value). This is expressed by the
following universally quantified formula:
∀n1,n2 : node, r1, r2 : round,v1,v2 : value. decision(n1, r1,v1) ∧ decision(n2, r2,v2) → v1 = v2 (4)
While the safety property holds in all the reachable states of the protocol, it is not inductive.
That is, assuming that it holds is not sufficient to prove that it still holds after an action is taken. For
example, consider a state s in which decision(n1, r1,v1) holds and there is a quorum q of nodes such
that, for every node n in q, vote_msg(n, r2,v2) holds, with v2 , v1. Note that the safety property
holds in s . However, a learn action introduces a transition from state s to a state s ′ in which both
decision(n2, r1,v1) and decision(n2, r2,v2) hold, violating the safety property. This counterexample
to induction does not indicate a violation of safety, but it indicates that the safety property needs
to be strengthened in order to obtain an inductive invariant. We now describe such an inductive
invariant.
Our inductive invariant contains, in addition to the safety property, the following rather simple
statements that are maintained by the protocol and are required for inductiveness:
∀r : round,v1,v2 : value. propose_msg(r ,v1) ∧ propose_msg(r ,v2) → v1 = v2 (5)
∀n : node, r : round,v : value. vote_msg(n, r ,v) → propose_msg(r ,v) (6)
∀r : round,v : value.
(∃n : node. decision(n, r ,v)) → ∃q : quorum.∀n : node. member(n,q) → vote_msg(n, r ,v) (7)
Equation (5) states that there is a unique proposal per round. Equation (6) states that a vote for
v in round r is cast only when a proposal for v has been made in round r . Equation (7) states
that a decision for v is made in round r only if a quorum of nodes have voted for v in round r . In
addition, the inductive invariant restricts the join-acknowledgment messages so that they faithfully
represent the maximal vote (up to the joined round), or ⊥ if there are no votes so far, and also
asserts that there are no actual votes at round ⊥:
∀n : node, r , r ′ : round, v,v ′ : value. join_ack_msg(n, r ,⊥,v) ∧ r ′ < r → ¬vote_msg(n, r ′,v ′) (8)
∀n : node, r , r ′ : round, v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ → r ′ < r ∧ vote_msg(n, r ′,v) (9)
∀n : node, r , r ′, r ′′ : round, v,v ′ : value.
join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ ∧ r ′ < r ′′ < r → ¬vote_msg(n, r ′′,v ′) (10)
∀n : node,v : value. ¬vote_msg(n,⊥,v) (11)
The properties stated so far are rather straightforward, and are usually not even mentioned in
paper proofs or explanations of the protocol. The key to the correctness argument of the protocol
is the observation that when the owner of round r2 proposes a value in r2, it cannot miss any value
that is choosable at a lower round: whenever a value v2 is proposed at round r2, then in all rounds
r1 prior to r2, no other value v1 , v2 is choosable. The property that no v1 , v2 is choosable at r1 is
captured in the inductive invariant by the requirement that in any quorum of nodes, there must be
at least one node that has already left round r1 (i.e., joined a higher round), and did not vote for v1
at r1 (and hence will also not vote for it in the future). Formally, this is:
∀r1, r2 : round,v1,v2 : value,q : quorum. propose_msg(r2,v2) ∧ r1 < r2 ∧v1 , v2 →
∃n : node, r ′, r ′′ : round,v : value. member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v1) ∧ r ′ > r1 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v)
(12)
The fact that this property is maintained by the protocol is obtained by the proposal mechanism
and the interaction between phase 1 and phase 2 (see Appendix B for a detailed explanation).
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Equations (4) to (12) define an inductive invariant that proves the safety of the Paxos model of
Fig. 3. However, the verification condition for this inductive invariant contains cyclic quantifier
alternations, and is therefore outside of EPR. We now review the quantifier alternations in the
verification condition, which originate both from the model and from the inductive invariant.
In the model, the axiomatization of quorums (Fig. 3 line 8) introduces a ∀∃-edge from quorum to
node. In addition, the assumption in the propose action that join-acknowledgment messages were
received from a quorum of nodes (line 39) introduces ∀∃-edges from node to round and from node
to value.
In the inductive invariant, only eqs. (7) and (12) include quantifier alternations (the rest are
universally quantified). Equation (7) has quantifier structure ∀round, value∃quorum∀node4. Note
that the inductive invariant appears both positively and negatively in the verification condition,
so eq. (7) adds ∀∃-edges from round to quorum and from value to quorum (from the positive
occurrence), as well as an edge from quorum to node (from the negative occurrence). While
the latter coincides with the edge that comes from the quorum axiomatization (line 8), the for-
mer edges closes a cycle in the quantifier alternation graph. Equation (12) has quantifier prefix
∀round, value, quorum∃node, round, value. Thus, it introduces 9 edges in the quantifier alterna-
tion graph, including self-loops at round and value. In conclusion, while the presented model in
first-order logic has an inductive invariant in first-order logic, the resulting verification condition
is outside of EPR.
6 PAXOS IN EPR
The quantifier alternation graph of the model of Paxos described in Section 5 contains cycles. To
obtain a safety proof of Paxos in EPR, we apply the methodology described in Section 3 to transform
this model in a way that eliminates the cycles from the quantifier alternation graph. The resulting
changes to the model are presented in Fig. 5, and the rest of this section explains them step by step.
6.1 Derived Relation for Left Rounds
We start by addressing the quantifier alternation that appears in eq. (12) as part of the inductive in-
variant. We observe that the following existentially quantified formula appears both as a subformula
there, and in the conditions of the join_round and the vote actions (Fig. 3 lines 29 and 50):
ψ1(n, r ) = ∃r ′, r ′′ : round,v : value. r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v)
This formula captures the fact that noden has joined a round higher than r , which means it promises
to never participate in round r in any way, i.e., it will neither join nor vote in round r . We add a
derived relation called left_round to captureψ1, so that left_round(n, r ) captures the fact that node
n has left round r . The formulaψ1 is in the class of formulas handled by the scheme described in
Section 3.3, and thus we obtain the initial condition and update code for left_round. The result
appears in Fig. 5 lines 4 and 15.
Rewriting (steps 3+4). Using the left_round relation, we rewrite the conditions of the join_round
and vote actions (Fig. 5 lines 10 and 31). These rewrites are trivially sound as explained in Section 3.2
(with a trivial rewrite condition). We also rewrite eq. (12) as:
∀r1, r2 : round,v1,v2 : value,q : quorum. propose_msg(r2,v2) ∧ r1 < r2 ∧v1 , v2 →
∃n : node, member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v1) ∧ left_round(n, r1) (13)
Equation (13) contains less quantifer alternations than eq. (12), and it will be part of the inductive
invariant that will eventually be used to prove safety.
4The local existential quantifier in (∃n : node.decision(n, r, v)) does not affect the quantifier alternation graph.
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Fig. 6. Counterexample to induction of EPR model of Paxos after the first attempt. The counterexample con-
tains one node n1 (depicted as square), two rounds r1 < r2 (depicted as circles), two values v1,v2, and a single
quorum (that contains n1). The figure displays the the join_ack_msg, joined_round, propose_msg, vote_msg
relations, as well as the < relation (derived from ≤). The action occurring in the counterexample is propose,
where an arbitrary value is proposed for r2, even though node n1 voted for v1 in r1. This erroneous behavior
occurs due to the fact that the representation invariant of joined_round is violated in the pre-state of the
counterexample: joined_round(n1, r2) holds, eventhough there is no corresponding join_ack_msg entry. This
allows a propose action to erroneously propose v2 for r2, in spite of the fact that v1 is choosable at r1.
6.2 Derived Relation for Joined Rounds
After the previous transformation, the verification condition is still not stratified. The reason is the
combination of eq. (13) and the condition of the propose action (Fig. 3 line 39):
∀n : node. member(n,q) → ∃r ′ : round, v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v).
While each of these introduces quantifier alternations that are stratified when viewed separately, to-
gether they form cycles. Equation (13) introduces ∀∃-edges from round and value to node, while the
propose condition introduces edges fromnode to round and value. The propose condition expresses
the fact that every node in the quorum q has joined round r by sending a join-acknowledgment (1b)
message to round r. However, because the join-acknowledgment message contains two more fields
(representing the node’s maximal vote so far), the condition existentially quantifies over them. To
eliminate this existential quantification and remove the cycles, we add a derived relation, called
joined_round, that captures the projection of join_ack_msg over its first two components, given by
the formula:
ψ2(n, r ) = ∃r ′ : round,v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v)
This binary relation over nodes and rounds records the sending of join-acknowledgment messages,
ignoring the maximal vote so far reported in the message. Thus, joined_round(n, r ) captures the fact
that node n has agreed to join round r . The formulaψ2 is in the class of formulas handled by the
scheme of Section 3.3, and thus we obtain the initial condition and update code for joined_round,
as it appears in Fig. 5 lines 5 and 16.
Rewriting (steps 3+4): first attempt. We rewrite the condition of the propose action to use
joined_round instead ofψ2. (The rewrite condition is again trivial, ensuring soundness.) The result
appears in Fig. 5 line 22, and is purely universally quantified. When considering the transformed
model, and the candidate inductive invariant given by the conjunction of eqs. (4) to (11) and (13),
the resulting quantifier alternation graph is acyclic. This means that the verification condition is
in EPR and hence decidable to check. However, it turns out that this candidate invariant is not
inductive, and the check yields a counterexample to induction.
The counterexample is depicted in Fig. 6. The counterexample shows a propose action that leads
to a violation of eq. (13). The example contains a single node n1 (which forms a quorum), that
has voted for value v1 in round r1, and yet a different value v2 is proposed for a later round r2
(based on the quorum composed only of n1) which leads to a violation of eq. (13). The propose
action is enabled since joined_round(n1, r2) holds. However, an arbitrary value is proposed since
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join_ack_msg is empty. The root cause for the counterexample is that the inductive invariant does
not capture the connection between joined_round and join_ack_msg, so it allows a state in which
a node n1 has joined round r2 according to joined_round (i.e., joined_round(n1, r2) holds), but it
has not joined it according to join_ack_msg (i.e., ∃r ′,v . join_ack_msg(n1, r2, r ′,v) does not hold).
Note that the counterexample is spurious, in the sense that it does not represent a reachable state.
However, for a proof by an inductive invariant, we must eliminate this counterexample nonetheless.
Rewriting (steps 3+4): second attempt. One obvious way to eliminate the counterexample discussed
above is to add the representation invariant of joined_round to the inductive invariant. However,
this will result in a cyclic quantifier alternation, causing the verification condition to be outside of
EPR. Instead, we will eliminate this counterexample by rewriting the code of the propose action,
relying on an auxiliary invariant to verify the rewrite, as explained in Section 3.2. We observe
that the mismatch between joined_round and join_ack_msg is only problematic in this example
because node n1 voted in r1 < r2. While the condition of the propose action is supposed to ensure
that the max operation considers past votes of all nodes in the quorum, such a scenario where
the joined_round is inconsistent with join_ack_msg makes it possible for the propose action to
overlook past votes, which is the case in this counterexample. Our remedy is therefore to rewrite
the max operation (which is implemented by an assume command, as explained before) to consider
the votes directly by referring to the vote messages instead of the join-acknowledgment messages
that report them. We first formally state the rewrite and then justify its correctness.
As before, we rewrite the condition of the propose action to use joined_round (Fig. 5 line 22). In
addition, we rewrite the max operation in Fig. 3 line 44, i.e., max {(r ′,v ′) | φ1(r ′,v ′)} where
φ1(r ′,v ′) = ∃n.member(n,q) ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥
to the max operation in Fig. 5 line 25, i.e., max {(r ′,v ′) | φ2(r ′,v ′)} where
φ2(r ′,v ′) = ∃n.member(n,q) ∧ vote_msg(n, r ′,v ′) ∧ r ′ < r
The key to the correctness of this change is that a join-acknowledgment message from node n to
round r contains its maximal vote prior to round r , and once the node sent this message, it will
never vote in rounds smaller than r . Therefore, while the original propose action considers the
maximum over votes reflected by join-acknowledgment messages from a quorum, looking at the
actual votes from the quorum in rounds prior to r (as captured by the vote_msg relation) yields the
same maximum.
Formally, we establish the rewrite condition of step 3 given by eq. (2) using an auxiliary in-
variant INVaux, defined as the conjunction of eqs. (5), (6) and (8) to (11). This invariant captures
the connection between join_ack_msg and vote_msg explained above. The invariant INVaux is
inductive for the original model, and its verification condition is in EPR (the resulting quanti-
fier alternation graph is acyclic). Second, we prove that under the assumption of INVaux and
the condition ∀n.member(n,q) → ∃r ′,v .join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) (Fig. 3 line 39), the operation
max{(r ′,v ′) | φ1(r ′,v ′)} is equivalent to the operation max{(r ′,v ′) | φ2(r ′,v ′)} (recall that both
translate to assume’s according to eq. (3)). This check is also in EPR. In conclusion, we are able to
establish the rewrite condition using two EPR checks: one for proving INVaux, and one for proving
eq. (2).
Inductive Invariant. After the above rewrite, the conjunction of eqs. (4) to (11) and (13) is still not
an inductive invariant, due to a counterexample to induction in which a node has joined a higher
round according to joined_round, but has not left a lower round according to left_round. As before,
the counterexample is inconsistent with the representation invariants. However, this time the coun-
terexample (and another similar one) can be eliminated by strengthening the inductive invariant
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with the following facts, which are implied by the representation invariants of joined_round and
left_round:
∀n : node, r1, r2 : round. r1 < r2 ∧ joined_round(n, r2) → left_round(n, r1) (14)
∀n : node, r , r ′ : round, v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) → joined_round(n, r ) (15)
Both are purely universally quantified and therefore do not affect the quantifier alternation graph.
Finally, the invariant given by the conjunction of eqs. (4) to (11) and (13) to (15) is indeed an
inductive invariant for the transformed model. Fig. 4 depicts the quantifier alternation graph of the
resulting verification condition. This graph is acyclic, and so the invariant can be verified in EPR.
This invariant proves the safety of the transformed model (Fig. 5). Using Theorem 3.1, the safety of
the original Paxos model (Fig. 3) follows.
7 MULTI-PAXOS
In this section we describe our verification of Multi-Paxos5. Multi-Paxos is an implementation of
state-machine replication (SMR): nodes run a sequence of instances of the Paxos algorithm, where
the ith instance is used to decide on the ith command in the sequence of commands executed by the
machine. For efficiency, when starting a round, a node uses a single message to simultaneously do
so in all instances. In response, each node sends a join-acknowledgment message that reports its
maximal vote in each instance; this message has finite size as there are only finitely many instances
in which the node ever voted. The key advantage over using one isolated incarnation of Paxos per
instance is that when a unique node takes on the responsibility of starting a round and proposing
commands, only phase 2 of Paxos has to be executed for every proposal.
Belowwe provide a description of the EPR verification ofMulti-Paxos. Themain change compared
to the Paxos consensus algorithm is in the modeling of the algorithm in first-order logic, where we
use the technique of Section 3.1.2 to model higher-order concepts. The transformation to EPR is
essentially the same as in Section 6, using the same derived relations and rewrites.
7.1 Model of the Protocol
Multi-Paxos uses the same message types as the basic Paxos algorithm, but when a node joins
a round, it sends a join-acknowledgment message (1a) with its maximal vote for each instance
(there will only be a finite set of instances for which it actually voted). Upon receipt of join-
acknowledgment messages from a quorum of nodes that join round r , the owner of the round r
determines the instances for which it is obliged to propose a value (because it may be choosable in
a prior round) and proposes values accordingly for these instances. Other instances are considered
available, and in these instances the round owner can propose any value. Next, the owner of round
r can propose commands in available instances (in response to client requests, which are abstracted
in our model). This means that the propose action of Paxos is split into two actions in Multi-Paxos:
one that processes the join-acknowledgment messages from a quorum and another that proposes
new values.
Our model of Multi-Paxos in first-order logic appears in Fig. 7. We explain the key differences
compared to the Paxos model from Fig. 3.
State. We extend the vocabulary of the Paxos model with two new sorts: instance and votemap.
The instance sort represents instances, and the propose_msg, vote_msg and decision relations are
extended to include an instance in each tuple. In practice, instances may be natural numbers that
give the order in which commands of the state machine must be executed by each replica. However,
5The version described here is slightly improved compared to [Padon et al. 2017], by using the unary active relation instead
of the binary available relation.
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1 sort node
2 sort quorum
3 sort round
4 sort value
5 sort instance
6 sort votemap
7
8 relation ≤ : round, round
9 axiom total_order(≤)
10 constant ⊥ : round
11 relation member : node, quorum
12 axiom ∀q1, q2 : quorum. ∃n : node. member(n, q1) ∧member(n, q2)
13
14 relation start_round_msg : round
15 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, votemap
16 relation propose_msg : instance, round, value
17 relation active : round
18 relation vote_msg : node, instance, round, value
19 relation decision : node, instance, round, value
20 function roundof : votemap, instance→ round
21 function valueof : votemap, instance→ value
22
23 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
24 init ∀n, r,m . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r,m)
25 init ∀i, r, v . ¬propose_msg(i, r, v)
26 init ∀r . ¬active(r )
27 init ∀n, i, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, i, r, v)
28 init ∀r, v . ¬decision(r, v)
29
30 action start_round(r : round) { assume r , ⊥ ; start_round_msg(r) := true }
31 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
32 assume r , ⊥ ∧ start_round_msg(r) ∧ ¬∃r ′,m . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′,m)
33 local m : votemap := ∗
34 assume ∀i . (roundof(m, i), valueof(m, i)) = max {(r ′, v ′) | vote_msg(n, i, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
35 join_ack_msg(n, r, m) := true
36 }
37 action instate_round(r : round, q : quorum) {
38 assume r , ⊥
39 assume ¬active(r)
40 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → ∃m . join_ack_msg(n, r,m)
41 local m : votemap := ∗
42 assume ∀i . (roundof(m, i), valueof(m, i)) = max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n,m′ . member(n, q) ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r,m′) ∧
43 r ′ = roundof(m′, i) ∧ v ′ = valueof(m′, i) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ }
44 active(r) := true
45 propose_msg(I, r, V ) := propose_msg(I, r, V ) ∨ (roundof(m, I ) , ⊥ ∧V = valueof(m, I ))
46 }
47 action propose_new_value(r : round, i : instance, v : value) {
48 assume r , ⊥
49 assume active(r) ∧ ∀v . ¬propose_msg(i, r, v)
50 propose_msg(r, v) := true
51 }
52 action vote(n : node, i : instance, r : round, v : value) {
53 assume r , ⊥ ∧ propose_msg(i, r, v) ∧ ¬∃r ′,m . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′,m)
54 vote_msg(n, i, r, v) := true
55 }
56 action learn(n : node, i : instance, r : round, v : value, q : quorum) {
57 assume r , ⊥ ∧ ∀n′ . member(n′, q) → vote_msg(n′, i, r, v)
58 decision(n, i, r, v) := true
59 }
Fig. 7. Model of Multi-Paxos as a transition system in many-sorted first-order logic.
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we are only interested in proving consistency (i.e., that decisions are unique per instance), and the
consistency proof does not depend on the instances being ordered. Therefore, our model does not
include a total order over instances.
The votemap sort models a map from instances to (round, value) pairs, which are passed in the
join-acknowledgment messages (captured by the relation join_ack_msg : node, round, votemap).
We use the encoding explained in Section 3.1.2, and add two functions, roundof : votemap, instance→
round and valueof : votemap, instance→ value, that allow access to the content of a votemap.
We also add a new relation active : round, to support the splitting of the propose action into
two actions. A round is considered active once the round owner has received a quorum of join-
acknowledgment messages, and then it can start proposing new values for available instances.
Actions. The start_round action is identical to Paxos, and the vote and learn actions are
identical except they are now parameterized by an instance. The join_round action is identical in
principle, except it now must obtain and deliver a votemap that maps each instance to the maximal
vote of the node (and ⊥ for instances in which the node did not vote). To express the computation
of the maximal vote of every instance i, we use an assume statement in line 34 of the form
∀i . (roundof(m, i), valueof(m, i)) = max {(r ′,v ′) | φ(i, r ′,v ′)} which follows a non-deterministic
choice of m : votemap. The assume statement is realized by the following formula in the transition
relation (which is an adaptation of eq. (3) to account for multiple instances):
∀i . (roundof(m, i) = ⊥ ∧ ∀r ′,v ′. ¬φ(i, r ′,v ′)) ∨
(roundof(m, i) , ⊥ ∧ φ(i, roundof(m, i), valueof(m, i)) ∧ ∀r ′,v ′. φ(i, r ′,v ′) → r ′ ≤ roundof(m, i))
(16)
Note that for line 34, φ is quantifier free, so eq. (16) is purely universally quantified.
The most notable difference in the actions is that, in Multi-Paxos, the propose action is split
into two actions: instate_round and propose_new_value. instate_round processes the join-
acknowledgment messages from a quorum, and propose_new_value proposes new values, mod-
eling the fact that only phase 2 is repeated for every instance.
The instate_round action takes placewhen the owner of a round received join-acknowledgment
messages from a quorum of nodes. The owner then finds the maximal vote reported in the messages
for each instance, which is done in line 42. This is realized using eq. (16). Observe that φ here
contains existential quantifiers over node and votemap. This introduces quantifier alternation,
which results in ∀∃ edges from instance to both node and votemap. Fortunately, these edges do
not create cycles in the quantifier alternation graph. Next, in line 44, the round is marked as active,
and in line 45, all obligatory proposals are made.
The propose_new_value action models the proposal of a new value in an available instance,
after the instate_round action took place and the round is made active. This action occurs due
to client requests, which are abstracted in our model. Therefore, the only preconditions of this
action in our model are that the instate_round action took place (captured by the active relation),
and that the instance is still available, i.e., that the round owner has not proposed any other value
for it. These preconditions are expressed in line 49. In practice, a round owner will choose the
next available instance (according to some total order). However, since this is not necessarily for
correctness, our model completely abstracts the total order over instances, and allows a new value
to be proposed in any available instance.
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7.2 Inductive Invariant
The safety property we wish to prove for Multi-Paxos is that each Paxos instance is safe. Formally:
∀i : instance,n1,n2 : node, r1, r2 : round,v1,v2 : value.
decision(n1, i, r1,v1) ∧ decision(n2, i, r2,v2) → v1 = v2 (17)
Equation (17) generalizes eq. (4) by universally quantifying over all instances. The inductive
invariant that proves safety contains similarly generalized versions of eqs. (5) to (11), where the
join_ack_msg relation is adjusted to contain a votemap element instead of a round, value pair as
the message content. In addition, the inductive invariant asserts that proposals are only made for
active rounds:
∀i : instance, r : round,v : value. propose_msg(i, r ,v) → active(r ) (18)
Finally, the inductive invariant for Multi-Paxos contains a generalized version of eq. (12), that
states that if round r is active, any value which is not proposed in it is also not choosable for lower
rounds:
∀i : instance, r1, r2 : round,v : value,q : quorum. active(r2) ∧ r1 < r2 ∧ ¬propose_msg(i, r2,v) →
∃n : node, r ′ : round,m : votemap. member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v) ∧ r ′ > r1∧
join_ack_msg(n, r ′,m)
(19)
This generalizes eq. (12), in which the condition is that another value is proposed, since proposals
are unique by eq. (5). Equations (17) to (19) together with eqs. (5) to (11) (generalized by universally
quantifying over all instances) provide an inductive invariant for the model of Fig. 7.
7.3 Transformation to EPR
As with the Paxos model of Fig. 3, the resulting verification condition for the Multi-Paxos model is
outside of EPR, and must be transformed to allow EPR verification. The required transformations
are essentially identical to the Paxos model (the new sorts do not appear in any cycles in the
quantifier alternation graph), where we define the left_round relation by:
ψ1(n, r ) = ∃r ′,m. r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′,m)
And the joined_round relation by:
ψ2(n, r ) = ∃m. join_ack_msg(n, r ,m)
The left_round relation is used to rewrite eq. (19) in precisely the same way it was used to rewrite
eq. (12). In addition, we rewrite the max operation in line 42 of Fig. 7 to use vote_msg instead of
join_ack_msg, which is exactly the same change that was required to verify the Paxos model. Thus,
the transformations to EPR are in this case completely reusable, and allow EPR verification of
Multi-Paxos.
8 PAXOS VARIANTS
In this section we briefly describe our verification in EPR of several variants of Paxos. More elaborate
explanations are provided in Appendix A. In all cases, the transformations to EPR of Section 6 were
employed (with slight modifications), demonstrating the reusability of the derived relations and
rewrites across different Paxos variants.
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8.1 Vertical Paxos
Vertical Paxos [Lamport et al. 2009] is a variant of Paxos whose set of participating nodes and
quorums (called the configuration) can be changed dynamically by an external reconfiguration
master. By using reconfiguration to replace failed nodes, Vertical Paxos makes Paxos reliable in the
long-term. The reconfiguration master dynamically assigns configurations to rounds, which means
that each round uses a different set of quorums. A significant algorithmic complication is that old
configurations must be eventually retired in practice. This is achieved by having the nodes inform
the master when a round r becomes complete, meaning that r holds all the necessary information
about choosable values in lower rounds. The master tracks the highest complete round and passes
it on to each new configuration to indicate that lower rounds need not be accessed. Rounds below
the highest complete round can then be retired safely.
We model configurations in first-order logic by introducing a new sort config that represents
a set of quorums, with a suitable member relation called quorum_in. Moreover, we change the
axiomatization of quorums to only require that quorums of the same configuration intersect:
∀c : config,q1,q2 : quorum. quorum_in(q1, c) ∧ quorum_in(q2, c) →
∃n : node.member(n,q1) ∧member(n,q2)
To model the complete round associated to each configuration, we introduce a function symbol
complete_of : config→ round. This function symbol introduces additional cycles to the quantifier
alternation graph. The transformation to EPR replaces the complete_of function by a derived relation
defined by the formula complete_of(c) = r . With this derived relation, we can rewrite the model
and invariant so that the function no longer appears in the verification condition, and hence the
cycles that it introduced are eliminated. Other than that, the transformation to EPR uses the same
derived relations and rewrites of Section 6 (in fact, it only requires the left_round derived relation).
A full description appears in Appendix A.1.
8.2 Fast Paxos
Fast Paxos [Lamport 2006] is a variant of Multi-Paxos that improves its latency. The key idea is to
mark some of the rounds as fast and allow any node to directly propose values in these rounds
without going through the round owner. As a result, multiple values can be proposed, as well as
voted for, in the same (fast) round. In order to maintain consistency, Fast Paxos uses two kinds of
quorums: classic quorums and fast quorums. The quorums have the property that any two classic
quorums intersect, and any classic quorum and two fast quorums intersect. Now, in a propose
action receiving join-acknowledgment messages from the classic quorum q with a maximal vote
reported in a fast roundmaxr , multiple different values may be reported by nodes in q inmaxr .
To determine which one may be choosable inmaxr , a node will check whether there exists a fast
quorum f such that all the nodes in q ∩ f reported voting v inmaxr . If yes, by the intersection
property of quorums, only this value v may be choosable inmaxr , and hence must be proposed.
Wemodel fast quorumswith an additional sort f_quorum (and relation f_member), and axiomatize
its intersection property as:
∀q : quorum, f1, f2 : f_quorum. ∃n : node. member(n,q) ∧ f_member(n, f1) ∧ f_member(n, f2)
The rest of the details of the model appear in Appendix A.2. The transformation to EPR is similar
to Section 6. This includes the rewrite of the new condition for proposing a value. Interestingly, in
this case, the verification of the latter rewrite is not in EPR when considering the formulas as a
whole, but it is in EPR when we consider only the subformulas that change (see Appendix A.2).
24
8.3 Flexible Paxos
Flexible Paxos [Howard et al. 2016] extends Paxos based on the observation that it is only necessary
for safety that every phase 1 quorum intersects with every phase 2 quorum (quorums of the same
phase do not have to intersect). This allows greater flexibility and introduces an adjustable trade-off
between the cost of deciding on new values and the cost of starting a new round. For example, in a
system with 10 nodes, one may use sets of 8 nodes as phase 1 quorums, and sets of 3 nodes phase 2
quorums. EPR verification of Flexible Paxos is essentially the same as for normal Paxos, except we
introduce two quorum sorts (for phase 1 and phase 2), and adapt the intersection axiom to:
∀q1 : quorum1,q2 : quorum2. ∃n : node. member1(n,q1) ∧member2(n,q2)
The detailed model and the adjusted invariant appear in Appendix A.3.
8.4 Stoppable Paxos
Stoppable Paxos [Lamport et al. 2008] extends Multi-Paxos with the ability for a node to propose a
special stop command in order to stop the algorithm, with the guarantee that if the stop command
is decided in instance i , then no command is ever decided at an instance j > i . Stoppable Paxos
therefore enables Virtually Synchronous system reconfiguration [Birman 2010; Chockler et al. 2001]:
Stoppable Paxos stops in a state known to all participants, which can then start a new instance of
Stoppable Paxos in a new configuration (e.g., in which participants have been added or removed);
moreover, no pending commands can leak from a configuration to the next, as only the final state
of the command sequence is transfered from one configuration to the next.
Stoppable Paxos may be the most intricate algorithm in the Paxos family: as acknowledged by
Lamport et al. [Lamport et al. 2008], “getting the details right was not easy”. The main algorithmic
difficulty in Stoppable Paxos is to ensure that no command may be decided after a stop command
while at the same time allowing a node to propose new commands without waiting, when earlier
commands are still in flight (which is important for performance). In contrast, in the traditional
approach to reconfigurable SMR [Lamport et al. 2010], a node that has c outstanding command
proposals may cause up to c commands to be decided after a stop command is decided; Those
commands needs to be passed-on to the next configuration and may contain other stop commands,
adding to the complexity of the reconfiguration system.
Before proposing a command in an instance in Stoppable Paxos, a node must check if other
instances have seen stop commands proposed and in which round. This creates a non-trivial
dependency between rounds and instances, which are mostly orthogonal concepts in other variants
of Paxos. This manifest as the instance sort having no incoming edge in the quantifier alternation
graph in other variants, while such edges appear in Stoppable Paxos. Interestingly, the rule given
by Lamport et al. to propose commands results in verification conditions that are not in EPR, and
rewriting seems difficult. However, we found an alternative rule which results in EPR verification
conditions. This alternative rule soundly overapproximates the original rule (and introduces new
behaviors), and, as we have verified (in EPR), it also maintains safety. The details of the modified
rule and its verification appear in Appendix A.4.
9 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented our methodology using the IVy tool [McMillan 2016; Padon et al. 2016],
which uses the Z3 theorem prover [de Moura and Bjørner 2008] for checking verification conditions.
Fig. 8 lists the run times for the automated checks performed when verifying the different Paxos
variants. The experiments were performed on a laptop running Linux, with a Core-i7 1.8 GHz
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EPR INVaux RW FOL − 2 FOL − 4 FOL − 8 FOL − 16
Protocol µ σ µ σ µ σ µ σ τ µ σ τ µ σ τ µ σ τ
Paxos 1.0 0.1 0.7 0 0.5 0 1.2 0.2 0 2.5 1.2 0 86 112 2 278 65 9
Multi-Paxos 1.2 0.1 0.8 0 0.6 0 1.2 0.1 0 1.8 0.4 0 107 129 3 229 110 7
Vertical Paxos 2.2 0.2 − − − − 27 10 0 47 32 0 209 104 5 274 78 9
Fast Paxos 4.7 1.6 0.9 0 0.6 0 3.7 0.9 0 19 25 0 127 97 2 300 0 10
Flexible Paxos 1.0 0 0.7 0 0.5 0 1.1 0.1 0 2.7 2.1 0 100 120 2 275 75 9
Stoppable Paxos 3.8 0.9 1.0 0 0.6 0 186 123 5 300 0 10 300 0 10 300 0 10
Fig. 8. Run times (in seconds) of checking verification conditions using IVy and Z3. Each experiment was
repeated 10 times (with random seeds used for Z3’s heuristics). µ reports the mean time, σ reports the
standard deviation, and τ reports the number of runs that timed out at 300 seconds (where this occurred).
EPR is the verification of the EPR model. INVaux is the verification of the auxiliary invariant. RW is the
verification of the rewrite condition. FOL − N is the run time of semi-bounded verification of the first-order
model, with bound 2 for values and bound N for rounds (in all variants, bounding the number of values and
rounds eliminates cycles from the quantifier alternation graph).
CPU. Z3 version 4.5.0 was used, along with the latest version of IVy (commit 7ce6738)6. Z3 uses
heuristics which employ randomness. Therefore, each experiment was repeated 10 times using
random seeds. We report the mean times, as well as the standard deviation and the number of
experiments which timed out at 300 seconds (these are included in the mean). The IVy files used
for these experiments are available at the supplementary web page of this paper7.
For each variant, Fig. 8 reports the time for checking the inductive invariant that proves the
safety of the EPR model, as well as the times required to verify auxiliary invariants and rewrite
conditions (see Section 3.2). We also report on the times required to check the inductive invariant
for the original first-order logic models, using semi-bounded verification. In all variants, quantifier
alternation cycles can be eliminated by bounding the number of values and rounds. We bound the
number of values to 2, and vary the bound on the number of rounds.
As Fig. 8 demonstrates, using our methodology for EPR verification results in verification
conditions that are solved by Z3 in a few seconds, with no timeouts, and with negligible variance
among runs. In contrast, when using semi-bounded verification, the run time quickly increases
as we attempt to increase the number of rounds. Moreover, the variance in run time increases
significantly, causing an unpredictable experience for verification users. We have also attempted
to use unbounded verification for the first-order logic models, but Z3 diverged in this case for all
variants. This shows the practical value of our methodology, as it allows to transform models whose
verification condition cannot be handled by Z3 (and demonstrate poor scalability and predictability
for bounded verification), into models that can be verified by Z3 in a few seconds.
10 RELATEDWORK
Automated verification of distributed protocols. Here we review several works that developed
techniques for automated verification of distributed protocols, and compare themwith our approach.
The Consensus Verification Logic CL [Dragoi et al. 2014] is a logic tailored to verify consensus
algorithms in the partially synchronous Heard-Of Model [Charron-Bost and Schiper 2009], with a
decidable fragment that can be used for verification. PSync [Dragoi et al. 2016] is a domain-specific
programming language and runtime for developing formally verified implementations of consensus
6Fig. 8 varies from [Padon et al. 2017], since the Multi-Paxos and the Stoppable Paxos models are slightly improved (see
Section 7), and a more recent version of IVy was used.
7http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~odedp/paxos-made-epr.html
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algorithms based on CL and the Heard-Of Model. Once the user provides inductive invariants
and ranking functions in CL, safety and liveness can be automatically verified. PSync’s verified
implementation of LastVoting (Paxos in the Heard-Of Model) is comparable in performance with
state-of-the-art unverified systems.
Many interesting theoretical decidability results, as well as the ByMC verification tool, have been
developed based on the formalism of Threshold Automata [Bloem et al. 2015; Konnov et al. 2017,
2015a,b]. This formalism allows to express a restricted class of distributed algorithms operating in
a partially synchronous communication mode. This restriction allows decidability results based on
cutoff theorems, for both safety and liveness.
[Alberti et al. 2016] present a decidable fragment of Presburger arithmetic with function symbols
and cardinality constraint over interpreted sets. Their work is motivated by applications to the veri-
fication of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, and they demonstrate automatic safety verification
of some fault-tolerant distributed algorithms expressed in a partially synchronous round-by-round
model similar to PSync.
#Π [v. Gleissenthall et al. 2016] present a logic that combines reasoning about set cardinalities
and universal quantifiers, along with an invariant synthesis method. The logic is not decidable, so a
sound and incomplete reasoning method is used to check inductive invariants. Inductive invariants
are automatically synthesized by method of Horn constraint solving. The technique is applied to
automatically verify a collection of parameterized systems, including mutual exclusion, consensus,
and garbage collection. However, Paxos-like algorithms are beyond the reach of this verification
methodology since they require more complicated inductive invariants.
Recently, [Maric et al. 2017] presented a cutoff result for consensus algorithms. They define ConsL,
a domain specific language for consensus algorithms, whose semantics is based on the Heard-Of
Model. ConsL admits a cutoff theorem, i.e., a parameterized algorithm expressed in ConsL is correct
(for any number of processors) if and only if it is correct up to a some finite bounded number
of processors (e.g., for Paxos the bound is 5) . This theoretical result shows that for algorithms
expressible in ConsL, verification is decidable. However, ConsL is focused on algorithms for the
core consensus problem, and does not support the infinite-state per process that is needed, e.g., to
model Multi-Paxos and SMR.
The above mentioned works obtain automation (and some decidability) by restricting the pro-
gramming model. We note that our approach takes a different path to decidability compared
to these works. We axiomatize arithmetic, set cardinalities, and other higher-order concepts in
an uninterpreted first-order abstraction. This is in contrast to the above works, in which these
concepts are baked into specially designed logics and formalisms. Furthermore, we start with a
Turing-complete modeling language and invariants with unrestricted quantifier alternation, and
provide a methodology to reduce quantifier alternation to obtain decidability. This allows us to
employ a general-purpose decidable logic to verify asynchronous Paxos, Multi-Paxos, and their
variants, which are beyond the reach of all of the above works.
Deductive verification in undecidable logic. IronFleet [Hawblitzel et al. 2015] is a verified imple-
mentation of SMR, using the Dafny [Leino 2010] program verifier, with verified safety and liveness
properties. Compared to our work, this system implementation is considerably more detailed. The
verification using Dafny employs Z3 to check verification conditions expressed in undecidable
logics that combine multiple theories and quantifier alternations. This leads to great difficulties due
to the unpredictability of the solver. To mitigate some of this unpredictability, IronFleet adopted a
style they call invariant quantifier hiding. This style attempts to specify the invariants in a way
that reduces the quantifiers that are explicitly exposed to the solver. Our work is motivated by the
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IronFleet experience and observations. The methodology we develop provides a more systematic
treatment of quantifier alternations, and reduces the verification conditions to a decidable logic.
Verification using interactive theorem provers. Recently, the Coq [Bertot and Castéran 2004] proof
assistant has been used to develop verified implementations of systems, such as a file system
[Chen et al. 2016], and shared memory data structures [Sergey et al. 2015]. Closer to our work is
Verdi [Wilcox et al. 2015], which presents a verified implementation of an SMR system based on
Raft [Ongaro and Ousterhout 2014], a Paxos-like algorithm. This approach requires great effort,
due to the manual process of the proof; developing a verified SMR system requires many months
of work by verification experts, and proofs measure in thousands of lines.
[Rahli et al. 2015; Schiper et al. 2014] verify the safety of implementations of consensus and SMR
algorithms in the EventML programming language. EventML interfaces with the Nuprl theorem
prover, in which proofs are conducted, and uses Nuprl’s code generation facilities.
Other works applied interactive theorem proving to verify Paxos protocols at the algorithmic
level, without an executable implementation. [Jaskelioff and Merz 2005] proved the correctness
of the Disk Paxos algorithm in Isabelle/HOL [Nipkow et al. 2002], in about 6,500 lines of proof
script. Recently, [Chand et al. 2016] presented safety proofs of Paxos and Multi-Paxos using the
TLA+ [Lamport 1994] specification language and the TLA Proof System TLAPS [Chaudhuri et al.
2010]. TLA+ has also been used in Amazon to model check distributed algorithms [Newcombe et al.
2015]. However, they did not spend the effort required to obtain formal proofs, and only used the
TLA+ models for bug finding via the TLA+ model checker [Yu et al. 1999].
Compared to our approach, using interactive theorem provers requires more user expertise and is
more labor intensive. We note that part of the difficulty in using an interactive theorem prover lies
in the unpredictability of the automated proof methods available and the considerable experience
needed to write proofs in an idiomatic style that facilitates automation. An interesting direction of
research is to integrate our methodology in an interactive theorem prover to achieve predictable
automation in a style that is natural to systems designers.
Works based on EPR. [Padon et al. 2016] and [McMillan 2016] have also used EPR to verify
distributed protocols and cache coherence protocols. [Padon et al. 2016] develops an interactive
technique for assisting the user to find universally quantified invariants (without quantifier alter-
nations). In contrast, here we use invariants that contain quantifier alternations, as used in proofs
of Paxos protocols. [McMillan 2016] goes beyond our work by extracting executable code from
the modeling language. In the future, we plan to apply a similar extraction methodology to Paxos
protocols.
In [Itzhaky 2014; Itzhaky et al. 2014, 2013] it was shown that EPR can express a limited form
of transitive closure, in the context of linked lists manipulations. We notice that in the context
of our methodology, their treatment of transitive closure can be considered as adding a derived
relation. This work and our work both show that EPR is surprisingly powerful, when augmented
with derived relations.
In [Feldman et al. 2017], bounded quantifier instantiation is explored as a possible solution to
the undecidability caused by quantifier alternations. This work shares some of the motivation and
challenges with our work, but proposes an alternative solution. The context we consider here is also
wider, since we deal not only with quantifier alternations in the inductive invariant, but also with
quantifier alternations in the transition relation. [Feldman et al. 2017] also shows an interesting
connection between derived relations and quantifier instantiation, and these insights may apply
to our methodology as well. An appealing future research direction is to combine user provided
derived relations and rewrites together with heuristically generated quantifier instantiation.
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11 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how to verify interesting distributed protocols using EPR—a decidable
fragment of first-order logic, which is supported by existing solvers (e.g., [Barrett et al. 2011;
de Moura and Bjørner 2008; Korovin 2008; Riazanov and Voronkov 2002]). To mitigate the gap
between the complexity of Paxos-like protocols and the restrictions of EPR, we developed a
methodology for gradually eliminating complications. While this process requires assistance from
the user, its steps are also mechanically checked (in EPR) to guarantee soundness.
We believe that our methodology can be applied to other distributed protocols as well, as our
setting is very general. The generality of our approach is rooted in the use of first-order logic, with
arbitrary relations and functions, and a Turing-complete imperative language.
While EPR has shown to be surprisingly powerful, we note that it is not a panacea, as some
cyclic quantifier alternations may not be avoided. Still, we have successfully used our methodology
to eliminate the cycles from several variants of Paxos, which is considered a rich and complex
protocol of great practical importance.
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A PAXOS VARIANTS
A.1 Vertical Paxos
Vertical Paxos [Lamport et al. 2009] is a variant of Paxos whose set of participating nodes and
quorums (called a configuration) can be changed dynamically by an external reconfiguration master
(master for short) assumed reliable. Vertical Paxos is important in practice because reconfiguration
allows to replace failed nodes to achieve long-term reliability. Moreover, by appropriately choosing
the quorums, Vertical Paxos can survive the failure of all but one node, compared to at most ⌊n/2⌋
nodes for Paxos, where n is the total number of nodes. Finally, the role of master in Vertical Paxos
is limited to managing configurations and requires few resources. A reliable master can therefore
be implemented cheaply using an independent replicated state machine. Vertical Paxos has two
variants, Vertical Paxos I and Vertical Paxos II. We consider only Vertical Paxos I.
In Vertical Paxos I, a node starts a round r only when directed to by the master through a
configure-round message that includes the configuration to use for round r . This allows the master
to change the configuration by directing a node to start a new round. Since quorums are now
different depending on the round, and quorums of different rounds may not intersect at all, we
require the owner of r to send start-round messages and to collect join-acknowledgment messages
from at least one quorum in each round r ′ < r (we say the the owner of round r accesses all
rounds r ′ < r ). However this may be costly in practice or simply impossible as nodes from old
configurations may not stay reachable forever.
To limit the number of previous rounds that must be accessed when starting a new round, the
master tracks the rounds r for which (a) no value is choosable at any r ′ < r , or (b) a valuev has beed
decided. Such a round r is said complete. Note that if r is complete, then rounds lower than r do not
need to be accessed anymore and can safely be retired, because a quorum of join-acknowledgment
messages from round r suffices to compute a value that is safe with respect to any decision that
may have been made below round r .
To let the configuration master keep track of complete rounds, a node noticing that a round
has become complete when it receives a quorum of join-acknowledgment messages notifies the
master. In turn, when directing a node to start a new round, the master passes on the highest
complete round it knows of along with the new configuration. A node starting a new round r then
only accesses the rounds above the highest complete round rc associated to the configuration of r ,
starting from rc .
A.1.1 FOL model of Vertical Paxos. We highlight the main changes compared to the FOL model
of Paxos.
Axiomatization of configurations. We model configurations in first-order logic by introducing
a new sort config, the relation quorum_in(c : config,q : quorum), and the function complete_of :
config→ round where quorum_in(c,q) means that quorum q is a quorum of configuration c and
complete_of(c) = r means that r is the complete round that the master associated to configuration
c . Note that the function complete_of never needs to be updated: when the master must associate
a particular complete round r to a configuration c , we simply pick c such that complete_of(c) = r
holds.
We change the intersection property of quorums to only require that quorums of the same
configuration intersect, with the following axiom:
∀c,q1,q2. quorum_in(c,q1) ∧ quorum_in(c,q2) → ∃n. member(n,q1) ∧member(n,q2) (20)
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State of the master. The state of the master consists of a single individual master_complete :
round that represents the highest complete round that the master knows of. The individual
master_complete is initializedd to the first round.
Messages. In addition to the messages used in Paxos, there are two kinds of messages exchanged
between the nodes and themaster. First, the master sendsmessages to instruct a round owner to start
a round with a prescribed configuration and complete round. The relation configure_round_msg(r :
round, c : config) models configure-round messages from the master, informing the owner of
round r that it must start round r with configuration c and complete round complete_of(c). Second,
nodes send messages to the master to notify it that a round has become complete. The relation
complete_msg(r : round) models a node notifying the master that round r has become complete.
Finally, in contrast to Paxos, start-round messages are not sent to all nodes, but only to the nodes
of the configuration of particular rounds. Therefore we make the start_round_msg(r : round, rp :
round) relation binary to model start-round messages from round r to the nodes in the configuration
of round rp.
Master actions. The action configure_round(r : round, c : config) models the master sending
a message to the owner of round r to inform it that it must start round r with configuration c
and complete round complete_of(c). When this action happens, we say that the master configures
round r . The master can perform this action when round r has not been configured yet and is
strictly greater than the highest complete round known to the master. Moreover, the master picks a
configuration c whose complete round equals its highest known complete round.
The action mark_complete(r : round) models the master receiving a notification from a node
that round r has become complete. The master then updates its estimate of the highest complete
round by updating the relation master_complete.
Node actions. As in Paxos, nodes perform five types of actions: start_round, join_round,
propose, vote, and learn. Themajor changes compared to Paxos is how the owner of a round starts
a new round and determines what proposal to make, i.e. the actions start_round, join_round,
and propose.
In the action start_round(r , c, cr ) the owner of round r starts r upon receiving a configure-
round message from the master instructing it to start r with a configuration c and a complete round
complete_of(c). The owner of round r broadcasts one join-round message to each configuration
corresponding to a round r ′ such that complete_of(c) ≤ r ′ < r .
The action join_round(n, r , rp) differs from Paxos in that it models node n responding to a start-
round message addressed specifically to round rp. Node n responds with a join-acknowledgment
message join_ack_msg(n, r , rp,v) indicating that n voted for v in rp. If n did not vote in rp, the
value component of the join-acknowledgment message is set to ⊥. Note that the meaning of a join-
acknowledgment message is different from Paxos; in Paxos, a join_ack_msg(n, r , rmax,v) message
contains the highest round rmax lower than r in which n voted.
In the action propose, the owner of round r makes a proposal to the configuration c associated
to r after receiving enough join-acknowledgment messages. The action requires that for each
round r ′ such that complete_of(c) ≤ r ′ < r , the owner of r received join-acknowledgment messages
from a quorum of the configuration of r ′ (which also requires that those rounds have a known
configuration). This is modeled in first-order logic by fixing a function quorum_of_round : round→
quorum and assuming that for every round r ′ such that complete_of(c) ≤ r ′ < r , the quorum
quorum_of_round(r ′) is a quorum of the configuration of r ′. To determine its proposal, the owner of
round r checks whether a vote was reported between complete_of(c) and r . If no vote was reported
(i.e. all join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) have v = ⊥), then the owner of r proposes an arbitrary value and
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notifies the master that r is complete, as no value can be choosable below r . If a vote was reported,
then the owner of round r computes the maximal roundmaxr , with complete_of(c) ≤ maxr < r ,
in which a vote v was reported and proposes v (in this case v is may still be choosable at a lower
round, so r is not complete).
The action vote(n,v, r ), modeling node n casting a vote for v in round r remains the same as
in Paxos. The action learn(n, r , c,v,q) differs from Paxos in that it must take into account the
configuration of a round to determine the quorums that must vote for a value v for v to become
decided. Moreover, a node making a decision notifies the master that round r has become complete,
modeled by updating the complete_msg relation.
The full FOL model of Vertical Paxos appears in fig. 9.
A.1.2 Inductive Invariant. As for Flexible Paxos and Fast Paxos, the safety property that we
prove is the same as in Paxos.
The core property of the inductive invariant, on top of the relation between proposals and
choosable values established for Paxos, is that a round r declared complete by a node is such that
either (a) no value is choosable in any round r ′ < r , or (b) there is a value v decided in r .
As for Paxos, we start with rather mundane properties that are required for the inductiveness.
The first such property is that there is at most one proposal per round:
∀r : round,v1,v2 : value. propose_msg(r ,v1) ∧ propose_msg(r ,v2) → v1 = v2. (21)
There is a most one configuration assigned to a round:
∀r : round, c1, c2 : config. configure_round_msg(r , c1) ∧ configure_round_msg(r , c2) → c1 = c2.
(22)
A start-round message is sent only upon receiving a configure-round message from the master:
∀r1, r2 : round. start_round_msg(r1, r2) → ∃c : config. configure_round_msg(r1, c). (23)
A start-round message starting round r1 is sent only to round strictly lower than r1:
∀r1, r2 : round. start_round_msg(r1, r2) → r2 < r1. (24)
A node votes only for a proposal:
∀r : round,n,v : value. vote_msg(n, r ,v) → propose_msg(r ,v) (25)
A proposal is made only when the configuration of lower rounds is known:
∀r1, r2 : round,v : value. propose_msg(r2,v) ∧ r1 < r2 → ∃c : config. configure_round_msg(r1, c).
(26)
The special round ⊥ is never used for deciding a value:
∀r : round,n : node. ¬propose_msg(r ,⊥) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r ,⊥) ∧ ¬decision(n, r ,⊥). (27)
A join-acknowledgment message is sent only in response to a start-round message:
∀n, r1, r2,v . join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2,v) → start_round_msg(r1, r2). (28)
The join-acknowledgment messages faithfully represent votes:
∀n, r1, r2,v . join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2,⊥) → ¬vote_msg(n, r2,v) (29)
∀n, r1, r2,v . join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2,v) ∧v , ⊥ → vote_msg(n, r2,v). (30)
A configure-round message configuring round r contains a complete round lower than r and lower
than the highest complete round known to the master:
∀r , c, cr. configure_round_msg(r , c) ∧ complete_of(c, cr) → cr ≤ r ∧ cr ≤ master_complete. (31)
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1 sort node, quorum, round, value, config
2
3 # in join_ack_msg, none indicates the absence of a vote.
4 individual ⊥: value
5
6 relation ≤ : round, round
7 axiom total_order(≤)
8
9 relation member : node, quorum
10 relation quorum_in(q : quorum, c : config)
11 axiom ∀c : config, q1, q2 .quorum_in(q1, c) ∧ quorum_in(q2, c)
12 → ∃n : node. member(n, q1) ∧member(n, q2)
13
14 relation start_round_msg : round, round
15 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
16 relation propose_msg : round, value
17 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
18 relation decision : node, round, value
19 relation configure_round_msg : round, config
20 individual complete_msg : round
21 individual complete_of : config→ round
22 # highest complete round known to the master (master state)
23 individual master_complete : round
24
25 init ∀r1, r2 . ¬start_round_msg(r1, r2)
26 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
27 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
28 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
29 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
30 init ∀r, c . ¬configure_round_msg(r, c)
31 init ∀r . ¬complete_msg(r )
32 # master_complete is initially set to the first round:
33 init ∀r ′ . master_complete(r ) ≤ r ′
34
35 # master actions:
36 action configure_round(r : round, c : config) {
37 assume ∀c . ¬configure_round_msg(r, c) # r is not configured
38 assume master_complete ≤ r
39 assume complete_of(c) = master_complete
40 configure_round_msg(r, c) := true
41 }
42 action mark_complete(r : round) {
43 assume complete_msg(r ) # a node sent a "complete" message
44 if (master_complete < r ) {
45 master_complete := r
46 }
47 }
48
49 # node actions:
50 action start_round(r : round, c : config, cr : round) {
51 # receive a configure−round message:
52 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
53 # get the complete round sent with the configuration:
54 assume cr = complete_of(c)
55 start_round_msg(r, R) :=
56 start_round_msg(r, R) ∨ (cr ≤ R ∧ R < r )
57 }
58 action join_round(n : node, r : round, rp : round) {
59 assume start_round_msg(r, rp)
60 assume ∄r ′, rp, v . join_ack_msg(n, r ′, rp, v) ∧ r < r ′
61 local v:value {
62 if (∀v ′ . ¬vote_msg(n, rp, v ′)) {
63 v := ⊥ }
64 else {
65 assume vote_msg(r, rp, v)
66 }
67 join_ack_msg(n, r, rp, v) := true
68 }
69 }
70 # local to propose:
71 individual quorum_of_round : round→ quorum
72 action propose(r : round, c : config, cr : round) {
73 quorum_of_round := ∗
74 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
75 assume complete_of(c) = cr
76 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
77 # rounds between the complete round and r must be configured:
78 assume ∀r ′ . cr ≤ r ′ < r → ∃c .configure_round_msg(r ′, c)
79 # quorum_of_round(r ′) is a quorum of the configuration of r ′:
80 assume ∀r ′ . cr ≤ r ′ < r ∧ configure_round_msg(r ′, c) →
81 quorum_in(quorum_of_round(r ′), c)
82 # got messages from all quorums between cr and r
83 assume ∀r ′, n . cr ≤ r ′ < r ∧member(n, quorum_of_round(r ′)) →
84 ∃v . join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v)
85 local maxr:round, v:value {
86 # find the maximal maximal vote in the quorums:
87 maxr, v = max {(r ′, v ′) |
88 ∃n .cr ≤ r ′ ∧ r ′ < r ∧member(n, quorum_of_round(r ′))
89 ∧join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v ′) ∧ v ′ , ⊥}
90 if (v = ⊥) {
91 v := ∗ # set v to an arbitrary value different from none.
92 assume v , ⊥
93 complete_msg(r ) := true # notify master that r is complete
94 }
95 propose_msg(r, v) := true # propose value v
96 }
97 action vote(n : node, r : round, v : value) {
98 assume v , ⊥
99 assume propose_msg(r, v)
100 # never joined a higher round:
101 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
102 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
103 }
104 action learn(n : node, r : round, c : config, v : value, q : quorum) {
105 assume v , ⊥
106 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
107 assume quorum_in(q, c)
108 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v) # 2b from quorum q
109 decision(n, r, v) := true
110 complete_msg(r ) := true
111 }
Fig. 9. Model of Vertical Paxos in many-sorted first-order logic.
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Any round lower than a round appearing in a complete messages has been configured:
∀r1, r2. complete_msg(r2) ∧ r1 ≤ r2 → ∃c . configure_round_msg(r1, c). (32)
The highest complete round known to the master or the complete round that the master assigns to
a configuration has been marked complete by a node or is the first round:
∀r1, r2, r3, c . (r2 = master_complete ∨ (configure_round_msg(r3, c) ∧ complete_of(c) = r2) ∧ r1 < r2 →
complete_msg(r2).
(33)
A decisions comes from a quorum of votes from a configured round:
∀r ,v . (∃n. decision(n, r ,v)) →
∃c : config,q. configure_round_msg(r , c) ∧ quorum_in(q, c)∧
(∀n.member(n,q) → vote_msg(n, rv)).
(34)
Note that the number of the invariants above may seem overwhelming, but those invariants are
easy to infer from the counterexamples to induction displayed graphically by IVy when they are
missing.
Finally, the two crucial invariants of Vertical Paxos I relate, first, proposals to choosable values
(similarly to Paxos), and, second, relate rounds declared complete to choosable values:
∀r1, r2,v1,v2,q, c .
r1 < r2 ∧ propose_msg(r2,v2) ∧v1 , v2 ∧ configure_round_msg(r1, c) ∧ quorum_in(q, c) →
∃n, r3, r4,v . member(n,q) ∧ r1 < r3 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r3, r4,v) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v1)
(35)
∀r1, r2,c,q.
complete_msg(r2) ∧ r1 < r2 ∧ configure_round_msg(r1, c) ∧ quorum_in(q, c))∧
¬(∃n, r3, r4,v .member(n,q) ∧ r1 < r3 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r3, r4,v) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r ,v)) →
∃n.decision(n, r ,v)
(36)
A.1.3 Transformation to EPR. As in Paxos, we start by introducing the derived relation left_round(n, r )
with representation invariant
∀n, r . left_round(n, r ) ↔ ∃r ′ > r , rp,v . join_ack_msg(n, r ′, rp,v) (37)
and we rewrite the join_round and propose accordingly.
Then, we notice that the function complete_of : config → round, together with eqs. (23), (26),
(32) and (34), creates a cycle in the quantifier alternation graph involving the sort config and
round. We eliminate this cycle by introducing the derived relation complete_of(c : config, r : round)
(here we overload complete_of to represent both the function and the relation) with representation
invariant
∀c, r . complete_of(c) = r ↔ complete_of(c, r ) (38)
We rewrite the configure_round, start_round, and propose actions to use the complete_of in
its relation form instead of the function. The function complete_of is now unused in the model and
we remove it, thereby eliminating the cycle in the quantifier alternation graph involving the sorts
config and round.
After this step we observe that the quantifier alternation graph is acyclic, and IVy successfully
verifies that the invariant is inductive.
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Surprisingly, the transformation of the Vertical Paxos I model to EPR is simpler than the trans-
formation of the Paxos model to EPR because we do not need to introduce the derived rela-
tion joined_round and, in consequence, to rewrite the propose action to use vote_msg instead of
join_ack_msg. The derived relation joined_round is not needed because, compared to Paxos, the
assume condition of the propose action contains the formula
∀r ′n. cr ≤ r ′ ∧ r ′ < r ∧member(n, quorum_of_round(c))→ ∃v : value.join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v)
(39)
instead of the formula
∀n : node. member(n,q) → ∃r ′ : round, v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v). (40)
Notice how eq. (39) introduces an edge in the quantifier alternation graph from sort node to value
only, whereas eq. (40) introduces an edge from sort round to sorts value and round. In combination
with the conjunct of the inductive invariant that expresses the relation between choosable values
and proposals, eq. (40) introduces a cycle in the quantifier alternation graph, whereas eq. (39) does
not.
The full model of Vertical Paxos in EPR appears in fig. 10
A.2 Fast Paxos
When a unique node starts a round, a value sent by a client to that node is decided by Paxos in at
most 3 times the worst-case message latency (one message to deliver the proposal to the owner of
the round, and one round trip for the owner of the round to complete phase 2). Fast Paxos [Lamport
2006] reduces this latency to twice the worst-case message latency under the assumption that
messages broadcast by the nodes are received in the same order by all nodes (a realistic assumption
in some settings, e.g., in an Ethernet network). When this assumption is violated, the cost of Fast
Paxos increases depending on the conflict-recovery mechanism employed.
In Fast Paxos, rounds are split into a set of fast rounds and a set of classic rounds (e.g. even
rounds are fast and odd ones are classic). In a classic round, nodes vote for the proposal that the
owner of the round sends and a value is decided when a quorum of nodes vote for it, as in Paxos.
However, in a fast round r , the owner can send an “any” message instead of a proposal, and a node
receiving it is allowed to vote for any value of its choice in r (but it cannot change its mind after
having voted). This allows clients to broadcast their proposals without first sending it to the leader,
saving on message delay. But, as a result, different values may be voted for in the same (fast) round,
a situation that cannot arise in Paxos.
Now that different values may be voted for in the same (fast) round, the rule used in the propose
action of Paxos to determine a value to propose does not work anymore, as there may be different
votes in the highest reported round. Remember that this rule ensured that the owner p of round r
would not miss any value choosable in a lower round r ′ < r . With different values being voted
for in fast round r ′, how is node p to determine which value is choosable in r ′? This problem is
solved by requiring that any 2 fast quorums and one classic quorum have a common node, and by
modifying the way p determines which value is choosable at r ′, as follows.
As in Paxos, the owner p waits for a classic quorum q of nodes to have joined its round r . If
the highest reported roundmaxr is a fast round and there are different votes reported inmaxr ,
then p checks whether there exists a fast quorum f such that all nodes in q ∩ f voted for the same
value v inmaxr ; if there is such a fast quorum f and value v , then p proposes v , and otherwise it
can propose any value. By the intersection property of quorums there can be at most one value v
satisfying those conditions. Moreover, if v is choosable at r ′, then there will be a fast quorum f
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1 sort node, quorum, round, value, config
2
3 # in join_ack_msg, none indicates the absence of a vote.
4 individual ⊥: value
5
6 relation ≤ : round, round
7 axiom total_order(≤)
8
9 relation member : node, quorum
10 relation quorum_in(q : quorum, c : config)
11 axiom ∀c : config, q1, q2 .quorum_in(q1, c) ∧ quorum_in(q2, c)
12 → ∃n : node.member(n, q1) ∧member(n, q2)
13
14 relation start_round_msg : round, round
15 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
16 relation propose_msg : round, value
17 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
18 relation decision : node, round, value
19 relation configure_round_msg : round, config
20 individual complete_msg : round
21 relation complete_of : config, round # replaced the function
22 # immutable, so we can use axiom:
23 axiom ∀c, r1, r2 . complete_of(c, r1) ∧ complete_of(c, r2) →
24 r1 = r2
25 # highest complete round known to the master (master state)
26 individual master_complete : round
27 relation left_round : node, round
28
29 init ∀r1, r2 . ¬start_round_msg(r1, r2)
30 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
31 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
32 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
33 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
34 init ∀r, c . ¬configure_round_msg(r, c)
35 init ∀r . ¬complete_msg(r )
36 # master_complete is initially set to the first round:
37 init ∀r ′ . master_complete(r ) ≤ r ′
38
39 # master actions:
40 action configure_round(r : round, c : config) {
41 assume ∀c . ¬configure_round_msg(r, c) # r is not configured
42 assume master_complete ≤ r
43 assume complete_of(c) = master_complete
44 configure_round_msg(r, c) := true
45 }
46 action mark_complete(r : round) {
47 assume complete_msg(r ) # a node sent a "complete" message
48 if (master_complete < r ) {
49 master_complete := r
50 }
51 }
52
53 # node actions:
54 action start_round(r : round, c : config, cr : round) {
55 # receive a configure−round message:
56 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
57 # get the complete round sent with the configuration:
58 assume complete_of(c, cr)
59 start_round_msg(r, R) :=
60 start_round_msg(r, R) ∨ (cr ≤ R ∧ R < r )
61 }
62 action join_round(n : node, r : round, rp : round) {
63 assume start_round_msg(r, rp)
64 assume ¬left_round(n, r ) # rewritten
65 local v:value {
66 if (∀v ′ . ¬vote_msg(n, rp, v ′)) {
67 v := ⊥ }
68 else {
69 assume vote_msg(r, rp, v)
70 }
71 join_ack_msg(n, r, rp, v) := true
72 left_round(n, R) := left_round(n, R) ∨ R < r
73 }
74 }
75 # local to propose:
76 individual quorum_of_round : round→ quorum
77 action propose(r : round, c : config, cr : round) {
78 quorum_of_round := ∗
79 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
80 assume complete_of(c, cr)
81 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
82 # rounds between the complete round and r must be configured:
83 assume ∀r ′ . cr ≤ r ′ < r → ∃c .configure_round_msg(r ′, c)
84 # quorum_of_round(r ′) is a quorum of the configuration of r ′:
85 assume ∀r ′ . cr ≤ r ′ < r ∧ configure_round_msg(r ′, c) →
86 quorum_in(quorum_of_round(r ′), c)
87 # got messages from all quorums between cr and r
88 assume ∀r ′, n . cr ≤ r ′ < r ∧member(n, quorum_of_round(r ′)) →
89 ∃v . join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v)
90 local maxr:round, v:value {
91 # find the maximal maximal vote in the quorums:
92 assume maxr, v =
93 max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n .cr ≤ r ′ ∧ r ′ < r ∧member(n, quorum_of_round(r ′))
94 ∧join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v ′) ∧ v ′ , ⊥}
95 if (v = ⊥) {
96 v := ∗ # set v to an arbitrary value different from none.
97 assume v , ⊥
98 complete_msg(r ) := true # notify master that r is complete
99 }
100 propose_msg(r, v) := true # propose value v
101 }
102 action vote(n : node, r : round, v : value) {
103 assume v , ⊥
104 assume propose_msg(r, v)
105 # never joined a higher round:
106 assume ¬left_round(n, r) # rewritten
107 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
108 }
109 action learn(n : node, r : round, c : config, v : value, q : quorum) {
110 assume v , ⊥
111 assume configure_round_msg(r, c)
112 assume quorum_in(q, c)
113 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v) # 2b from quorum q
114 decision(n, r, v) := true
115 complete_msg(r ) := true
116 }
Fig. 10. Model of Vertical Paxos in EPR.
38
such that all nodes in q ∩ f voted for v atmaxr . If there is only a single value v reported voted for
inmaxr , then p proposes v , as in Paxos.
In Paxos, a round may not decide a value if its owner is not able to contact a quorum of nodes
before they leave the round (e.g. because the owner crashed, is slow, or because of message losses
in the network). In Fast Paxos there is one more cause for a round not deciding a value: a fast round
r may not decide a value if the votes cast in r are such that, no matter what new votes are cast
from this point on, no value can be voted for by a fast quorum (e.g. when every nodes voted for
a different value). In this case we say that a conflict has occured. Fast Paxos has three different
conflict-recovery mechanisms: starting a new round, coordinated recovery, and uncoordinated
recovery. Our model does not include coordinated or uncoordinated recovery, but starting a new
round is of course part of the model.
A.2.1 FOLmodel of Fast Paxos. The FOLmodel of Fast Paxos appears in fig. 11.We now highlight
the main changes compared to the FOL model of Paxos.
Quorums. We axiomatize the properties of fast quorums and classic quorums in first-order logic
by defining two different sorts c_quorum and f_quorum for classic and fast quorums, and a separate
membership relation for each. The intersection properties of quorums are expressed as follows:
∀q1,q2 : c_quorum.∃n : node.c_member(n,q1) ∧ c_member(n,q2) (41)
∀q : c_quorum, f1, f2 : f_quorum.∃n : node.c_member(n,q) ∧ f_member(n, f1) ∧ f_member(n, f2)
(42)
New relations. To identify fast rounds we add a unary relation fast : round which contains all fast
rounds. We add a relation any_msg to model the “any” messages sent by the owners of fast rounds.
Actions. The start_round, vote, and join_round actions remain the same as in Paxos. The
propose action is modified to reflect the new rule that the owner of a round r uses to determine
what command to propose. We start by assuming the owner has received join-acknowledgment
messages from a quorum q (line 64), and we compute the maximal reported roundmaxr and pick a
vote v reported atmaxr (line 69). Note that there may be different votes reported inmaxr ifmaxr
is a fast round.
If at least one vote was reported (maxr , ⊥), then the owner propose the value v ′ chosen as
follows (line 76): if there exists a fast quorum f such that all nodes in f ∩ q reported voting for v ′
atmaxr , then the owner proposes v ′. Otherwise, if no such fast quorum exists, it proposes v (as
defined above). Formally, we assume
(∃f . ∀n. f_member(n, f ) ∧ c_member(n,q) → join_ack_msg(n, r ,maxr ,v ′))
∨ (v ′ = v ∧ ∀v ′′, f ′. ∃n. f_member(n, f ′) ∧ c_member(n,q) ∧ ¬join_ack_msg(n, r ,maxr ,v ′′))
(43)
If no vote was reported (maxr = ⊥) then, if the round being started is a fast round then the owner
sends an “any” message, and otherwise the owner proposes an arbitrary value.
Finally, we replace the learn action by two actions c_decide and f_decide that update the
decision relation when a classic (for c_decide) or fast (for f_decide) quorum has voted for the
same value in the same round.
A.2.2 Inductive Invariant. The safety property we prove is the same as in Paxos, namely that all
decisions are for the same value regardless of the node making them and of the round in which
they are made:
∀n1,n2, r1, r2,v . decision(n1, r1,v1) ∧ decision(n2, r2,v2) → v1 = v2 (44)
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The inductive invariant is similar to the one of Paxos with cases to distinguish classic and fast
rounds. The main addition is that no value can be choosable at a round r ′ < r when there is an
“any” message in r .
We start by expressing rather mundane facts about the algorithm, but which are necessary for
inductiveness. There is at most one proposal per round:
∀r : round,v1,v2 : value. ¬fast(r ) ∧ propose_msg(r ,v1) ∧ propose_msg(r ,v2) → v1 = v2. (45)
In a classic round, nodes voted for a value v only if v was proposed:
∀r : round,n,v : value. ¬fast(r ) ∧ vote_msg(n, r ,v) → propose_msg(r ,v). (46)
An “any” message can occur only in a fast round:
∀r : round. any_msg(r ) → fast(r ). (47)
In a fast round, a node votes for a value v only if v was proposed or if an “any” message was sent
in the round:
∀r : round,n,v . fast(r ) ∧ vote_msg(n, r ,v) → (propose_msg(r ,v) ∨ any_msg(r )). (48)
There cannot be both a proposal and an any message in the same round:
∀r : round,v . ¬(propose_msg(r ,v) ∧ any_msg(r )). (49)
A node votes only once per round:
∀n : node, r : round,v1,v2 : value. vote_msg(n, r ,v1) ∧ vote_msg(n, r ,v2) → v1 = v2. (50)
There is no vote in the round ⊥:
∀n : node,v : value. ¬vote_msg(n,⊥,v). (51)
Decisions come from fast quorums in fast rounds and classic quorums in classic rounds:
∀r : round,v : value. ¬fast(r ) ∧ (∃n : node.decision(n, r ,v)) →
∃q : c_quorum.∀n : node.c_member(n,q) → vote_msg(n, r ,v) (52)
∀r : round,v : value. fast(r ) ∧ (∃n : node.decision(n, r ,v)) →
∃f : f_quorum.∀n : node.f_member(n, f ) → vote_msg(n, r ,v). (53)
Then we express the fact that join-acknowledgment messages faithfully represent the node votes
(exactly as in Paxos).
∀n : node, r , r ′ : round, v,v ′ : value. join_ack_msg(n, r ,⊥,v) ∧ r ′ < r → ¬vote_msg(n, r ′,v ′)
(54)
∀n : node, r , r ′ : round, v : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ → (55)
r ′ < r ∧ vote_msg(n, r ′,v) (56)
∀n : node, r , r ′, r ′′ : round, v,v ′ : value. join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ ∧ r ′ < r ′′ < r →
¬vote_msg(n, r ′′,v ′). (57)
Finally, we express that if v is choosable at round r , then only v can be proposed at a round
r ′ > r , and that there cannot be an “any” message at a round r ′ > r . We differentiate the case of a
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value choosable in a classic round and in a fast round.
∀r1, r2,v1,v2,q : c_quorum. ¬fast(r1) ∧ ((propose_msg(r2,v2) ∧v1 , v2) ∨ any_msg(r2)) ∧ r1 < r2 →
∃n : node, r ′, r ′′ : round,v : value. c_member(n,q)
∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v1) ∧ r ′ > r1 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v)
(58)
∀r1, r2,v1,v2, f : f_quorum. fast(r1) ∧ ((propose_msg(r2,v2) ∧v1 , v2) ∨ any_msg(r2)) ∧ r1 < r2 →
∃n : node, r ′, r ′′ : round,v : value. f_member(n, f )
∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v1) ∧ r ′ > r1 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v)
(59)
A.2.3 Transformation to EPR. To transform the Fast Paxos model to EPR we introduce the
same derived relations as in Paxos (i.e. left_round and joined_round) and we rewrite as explained
in section 6. However the verification of the second rewrite step is not as simple as in Paxos.
This step consists in rewriting the propose action by considering directly votes instead of join-
acknowledgment messages. In Paxos, we verified the rewrite using the auxiliary invariant INVaux ,
and the verification condition is in EPR. We employ the same method for Fast Paxos, using eqs. (45)
to (57) as auxiliary invariant. However, for Fast Paxos, the verification condition of the rewrite does
not fall in EPR when done naively.
Verifying the rewrite of the statement at line line 69, from
max{(r ′,v ′) | ∃n. c_member(n,q) ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥} (60)
to
max{(r ′,v ′) | ∃n. c_member(n,q) ∧ vote_msg(n, r ,v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ ∧ r ′ < r } (61)
is exactly as in Paxos and poses no problem.
However, we also need to verify the rewrite of the assume statement at line 76 from assuming
(∃f . ∀n. f_member(n, f ) ∧ c_member(n,q) → join_ack_msg(n, r ,maxr ,v ′))
∨ (v ′ = v ∧ ∀v ′′, f ′. ∃n. f_member(n, f ′) ∧ c_member(n,q) ∧ ¬join_ack_msg(n, r ,maxr ,v ′′))
(62)
to assuming
(∃f . ∀n. f_member(n, f ) ∧ c_member(n,q) → vote_msg(n,maxr ,v ′))
∨ (v ′ = v ∧ ∀v ′′, f ′. ∃n. f_member(n, f ′) ∧ c_member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n,maxr ,v ′′)) (63)
With the assume statement at the beginning of the propose action (without which the equivalence
does not hold)
∀n. c_member(n,q) → ∃r ′,v . join_ack_msg(n, r , r ′,v) (64)
we get a verification condition that is not stratified: there is a cycle involving the sorts node and
value in the quantifier alternation graph. However, as explained in section 3.2, we observe that we
only have to verify the rewrite of the sub-formula c_member(n,q) ∧ ¬join_ack_msg(n, r ,maxr ,v ′′)
to c_member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n,maxr ,v ′′). Assuming the auxiliary invariant and the conditions
of the assume statements of the propose action before line 76, this equivalence check falls in EPR
and successfully verifies.
The EPR model of Fast Paxos appears in fig. 12.
41
1 sort node
2 sort round
3 sort value
4 sort c_quorum # classic quorums
5 sort f_quorum # fast quorums
6 relation fast : round # identifies fast rounds
7
8 relation ≤ : round, round
9 axiom total_order(≤)
10 constant ⊥ : round
11
12 relation c_member : node, c_quorum
13 relation f_member : node, f_quorum
14 # classic quorums intersect
15 axiom ∀q1, q2 : c_quorum.
16 ∃n . c_member(n, q1) ∧ c_member(n, q2)
17 # a classic quorum and a two fast quorums intersect
18 axiom ∀q1 : c_quorum.∀q2, q3 : f_quorum.
19 ∃n . c_member(n, q1) ∧ f_member(n, q2) ∧ f_member(n, q3)
20
21 relation start_round_msg : round
22 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
23 relation propose_msg : round, value
24 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
25 relation decision : node, round, value
26 relation any_msg : round # the any messages
27
28 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
29 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
30 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
31 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
32 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
33 init ∀r . ¬any_msg(r )
34
35 action start_round(r : round) {
36 assume r , ⊥
37 start_round_msg(r) := true
38 }
39 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
40 assume r , ⊥
41 assume start_round_msg(r)
42 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
43 # find the maximal round in which n voted,
44 # and the corresponding vote.
45 # maxr = ⊥ and v is arbitrary when n never voted.
46 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
47 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v) := true
48 }
49 action vote = {
50 # receive a 2a or "any" message and send 2b
51 local n:node, v:value, r:round {
52 assume r , ⊥
53 assume ∄r ′, r ′′, v . join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v) ∧ r < r ′
54 assume ∀v .¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
55 # vote for a proposal, or vote arbitrarily if there is an "any" message.
56 assume propose_msg(r, v) ∨any_msg(r)
57 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
58 }
59 }
60 action propose(r : round, q : c_quorum) {
61 assume r , ⊥
62 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
63 # 1b from quorum q
64 assume ∀n . c_member(n, q) → ∃r ′, v . join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v)
65 # find the maximal round in which a node in the quorum reported
66 # voting, and pick corresponding vote (there may be several).
67 # v is arbitrary if the nodes reported not voting.
68 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n . c_member(n, q)
69 ∧join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥}
70 if (maxr , ⊥) {
71 # a vote was reported in round maxr,
72 # and there are no votes in higher rounds.
73 local v ′ # the proposal the node will make
74 assume
75 (∃f . ∀n . f_member(n, f ) ∧ c_member(n, q) →
76 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v ′))
77 ∨ (v ′ = v ∧ ∀v ′′, f ′ . ∃n . f_member(n, f ′) ∧ c_member(n, q)
78 ∧¬join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v ′′))
79 propose_msg(r, v ′) := true
80 } else { # no vote was reported at all.
81 if fast(r ) {
82 any_msg(r ) := true # fast round, send any_msg
83 } else {
84 propose_msg(r, v) := true # classic round, propose an arbitrary value
85 }
86 }
87 }
88 action c_decide(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : c_quorum) {
89 assume r , ⊥
90 # 2b from classic quorum q:
91 assume ∀n . c_member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v)
92 decision(n, r, v) := true
93 }
94 action f_decide(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : f_quorum) {
95 assume r , ⊥
96 # 2b from fast quorum q:
97 assume ∀n . f_member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v)
98 decision(n, r, v) := true
99 }
Fig. 11. Model of Fast Paxos in in many-sorted first-order logic.
A.3 Flexible Paxos
Flexible Paxos [Howard et al. 2016] extends Paxos based on the observation that in Paxos it is
only necessary that every phase-1 quorum intersects with every phase-2 quorum (quorums of the
same phase do not have to intersect). Thus nodes may use different sets of quorums for phase 1 (to
compute which value may be choosable in lower rounds) and for phase 2 (to get a value decided in
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1 sort node
2 sort round
3 sort value
4 sort c_quorum # classic quorums
5 sort f_quorum # fast quorums
6 relation fast : round # identifies fast rounds
7
8 relation ≤ : round, round
9 axiom total_order(≤)
10 constant ⊥ : round
11
12 relation c_member : node, c_quorum
13 relation f_member : node, f_quorum
14 # classic quorums intersect
15 axiom ∀q1, q2 : c_quorum.
16 ∃n . c_member(n, q1) ∧ c_member(n, q2)
17 # a classic quorum and a two fast quorums intersect
18 axiom ∀q1 : c_quorum.∀q2, q3 : f_quorum.
19 ∃n . c_member(n, q1) ∧ f_member(n, q2) ∧ f_member(n, q3)
20
21 relation start_round_msg : round
22 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
23 relation propose_msg : round, value
24 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
25 relation decision : node, round, value
26 relation any_msg : round # the any messages
27 relation left_round : node, round
28 relation joined_round : node, round
29
30 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
31 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
32 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
33 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
34 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
35 init ∀r . ¬any_msg(r )
36 init ∀n, r . ¬left_round(n, r )
37 init ∀n, r . ¬joined_round(n, r )
38
39 action start_round(r : round) {
40 assume r , ⊥
41 start_round_msg(r) := true
42 }
43 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
44 assume r , ⊥
45 assume start_round_msg(r)
46 assume ¬left_round(n, r ) # rewritten
47 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
48 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v) := true
49 # generated update code for derived relations:
50 left_round(n, R) := left_round(n, R) ∨ R < r
51 joined_round(n, r) := true
52 }
53 action vote = {
54 # receive a 2a or "any" message and send 2b
55 local n:node, v:value, r:round {
56 assume r , ⊥
57 assume ∄r ′, r ′′, v . join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v) ∧ r < r ′
58 assume ∀v .¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
59 # vote for a proposal, or vote arbitrarily if there is an "any" message.
60 assume propose_msg(r, v) ∨any_msg(r)
61 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
62 }
63 }
64 action propose(r : round, q : c_quorum) {
65 assume r , ⊥
66 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
67 # 1b from quorum q
68 assume ∀n . c_member(n, q) → joined_round(n, r ) # rewriten
69 # find the maximal round in which a node in the quorum reported
70 # voting, and pick corresponding vote (there may be several).
71 # v is arbitrary if the nodes reported not voting.
72 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n . c_member(n, q)
73 ∧vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ ∧ r ′ < r } # rewritten
74 if (maxr , ⊥) {
75 # a vote was reported in maxr, and there are no votes in higher rounds.
76 local v ′ # the proposal the node will make
77 assume
78 (∃f . ∀n . f_member(n, f ) ∧ c_member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, maxr, v ′))
79 ∨ (v ′ = v ∧ ∀v ′′, f ′ . ∃n . f_member(n, f ′) ∧ c_member(n, q)
80 ∧¬vote_msg(n, maxr, v ′′)) #rewritten
81 propose_msg(r, v ′) := true
82 } else { # no vote was reported at all.
83 if fast(r ) {
84 any_msg(r ) := true # fast round, send any_msg
85 } else {
86 propose_msg(r, v) := true # classic round, propose an arbitrary value
87 }
88 }
89 }
90 action c_decide(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : c_quorum) {
91 assume r , ⊥
92 # a classic quorum q sent 2b messages:
93 assume ∀n . c_member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v)
94 decision(n, r, v) := true
95 }
96 action f_decide(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : f_quorum) {
97 assume r , ⊥
98 # a fast quorum q sent 2b messages:
99 assume ∀n . f_member(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v)
100 decision(n, r, v) := true
101 }
Fig. 12. Model of Fast Paxos in EPR.
the current round) as long as every phase-1 quorum intersects every phase-2 quorum. For example,
in a system with a large number of nodes, one may choose that a value is decided if any set of
3 nodes (a phase-2 quorum) votes for it, and at the same time require that a node wait for n − 2
nodes (a phase-1 quorum) to join its round when starting a new round, where n is the total number
of nodes. The opposite configuration is also possible (i.e. phase-1 quorums of size 3 and phase-2
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quorums of size n − 2). This approach allows a trade-off between the cost of starting a new round
and the cost of deciding on a value. Note that no inconsistency may arise due to the fact that
same-phase quorums do not intersect because the leader of a round proposes a unique value.
To model Flexible Paxos in IVY we introduce two sorts for the two different types of quorums,
quorum_1 and quorum_2, and we modify the actions to use quorums of sort quorum_1 in phase 1
and of sort quorum_2 in phase 2. We also adapt the quorum intersection axiom:
∀q1 : quorum1,q2 : quorum2. ∃n : node. member1(n,q1) ∧member2(n,q2).
The derived relations and rewriting steps are the same as in Paxos, and the safety property and
inductive invariant is also the same as in Paxos except that the quorums are taken from the sort
quorum_2 in eq. (7) and eq. (12).
The FOL model of Flexible Paxos appears in fig. 13.
A.4 Stoppable Paxos
Stoppable Paxos [Lamport et al. 2008] extends Multi-Paxos with the ability for a node to propose a
special stop command in order to stop the algorithm, with the guarantee that if the stop command
is decided in instance i , then no command is ever decided at an instance j > i . Stoppable Paxos
therefore enables Virtually Synchronous system reconfiguration [Birman 2010; Chockler et al. 2001]:
Stoppable Paxos stops in a state known to all participants, which can then start a new instance of
Stoppable Paxos in a new configuration (e.g., in which participants have been added or removed);
moreover, no pending commands can leak from a configuration to the next, as only the final state
of the command sequence is transfered from one configuration to the next.
Stoppable Paxos may be the most intricate algorithm in the Paxos family: as acknowledged by
Lamport et al. [Lamport et al. 2008], “getting the details right was not easy”. The main algorithmic
difficulty in Stoppable Paxos is to ensure that no command may be decided after a stop command
while at the same time allowing a node to propose new commands without waiting, when earlier
commands are still in flight (which is important for performance). In contrast, in the traditional
approach to reconfigurable SMR [Lamport et al. 2010], a node that has c outstanding command
proposals may cause up to c commands to be decided after a stop command is decided; Those
commands needs to be passed-on to the next configuration and may contain other stop commands,
adding to the complexity of the reconfiguration system.
Before proposing a command in an instance in Stoppable Paxos, a node must check if other
instances have seen stop commands proposed and in which round. This creates a non-trivial
dependency between rounds and instances, which are mostly orthogonal concepts in other variants
of Paxos. This manifest as the instance sort having no incoming edge in the quantifier alternation
graph in other variants, while such edges appear in Stoppable Paxos. Interestingly, the rule given
by Lamport et al. to propose commands results in verification conditions that are not in EPR, and
rewriting seems difficult. However, we found an alternative rule which results in EPR verification
conditions. This alternative rule soundly overapproximates the original rule (and introduces new
behaviors), and, as we have verified (in EPR), it also maintains safety. The details of the modified
rule and its verification appear in
Stoppable Paxos uses the same messages and actions as Multi-Paxos, and a special command
value stop. In addition to the usual consensus property of Paxos, Stoppable Paxos ensures the
following safety property, ensuring that nothing is ever decided after a stop value is decided:
∀i1, i2 : instance,n1,n2 : node, r1, r2 : round,v : value.
decision(n1, i1, r1, stop) ∧ i2 > i1 → ¬decision(n2, i2, r2,v) (65)
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1 sort node, round, value
2 # two types of quorums
3 sort quorum_1
4 sort quorum_2
5
6 relation ≤ : round, round
7 axiom total_order(≤)
8 constant ⊥ : round
9
10 relation member_1(n : node, q : quorum_1)
11 relation member_2(n : node, q : quorum_2)
12 axiom ∀q1 : quorum_1, q2 : quorum_2. ∃n : node. member_1(n, q1) ∧member_2(n, q2)
13
14 relation start_round_msg : round
15 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, round, value
16 relation propose_msg : round, value
17 relation vote_msg : node, round, value
18 relation decision : node, round, value
19
20 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
21 init ∀n, r1, r2, v . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r1, r2, v)
22 init ∀r, v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
23 init ∀n, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, r, v)
24 init ∀n, r, v . ¬decision(n, r, v)
25
26 action start_round(r : round) {
27 assume r , ⊥
28 start_round_msg(r) := true
29 }
30 action join_round(n : node, r : round) {
31 assume r , ⊥
32 assume start_round_msg(r)
33 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
34 # find the maximal round in which n voted, and the corresponding vote.
35 # maxr = ⊥ and v is arbitrary when n never voted.
36 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | vote_msg(n, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ < r}
37 join_ack_msg(n, r, maxr, v) := true
38 }
39 action propose(r : round, q : quorum_1) {
40 assume r , ⊥
41 assume ∀v . ¬propose_msg(r, v)
42 # 1b from a phase−1 quorum q:
43 assume ∀n . member_1(n, q) → ∃r ′, v . join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v)
44 # find the maximal round in which a node in the quorum reported
45 # voting, and the corresponding vote.
46 # v is arbitrary if the nodes reported not voting.
47 local maxr, v := max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n . member_1(n, q)
48 ∧join_ack_msg(n, r, r ′, v ′) ∧ r ′ , ⊥}
49 propose_msg(r, v) := true # propose value v
50 }
51 action vote(n : node, r : round, v : value) {
52 assume r , ⊥
53 assume propose_msg(r, v)
54 assume ¬∃r ′, r ′′, v . r ′ > r ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′, v)
55 vote_msg(n, r, v) := true
56 }
57 action learn(n : node, r : round, v : value, q : quorum_2) {
58 assume r , ⊥
59 assume ∀n . member_2(n, q) → vote_msg(n, r, v) # 2b from a phase−2 quorum q
60 decision(n, r, v) := true
61 }
Fig. 13. Model of the Flexible Paxos consensus algorithm as a transition system in many-sorted first-order
logic
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In order to obtain this property, Stoppable Paxos uses an intricate condition in the instate_round
action, to ensure that if a stop value is choosable at instance i1, then no value is be proposed for any
instance i2 > i1. Recall that in Multi-Paxos, the owner of round r takes the instate_round action
once it has received join-acknowledgment messages from a quorum of nodes. These messages allow
to compute the maximal vote (by round number) in each instance, by any node in the quorum. Let
m denote the votemap representing these voted (as computed in Fig. 7 line 42). In Multi-Paxos, these
votes are simply re-proposed for round r . However, in Stoppable Paxos we must take special care for
stop commands. Suppose that for some instance i1, we have roundof(m, i1) , ⊥ ∧ valueof(m, i1) =
stop. Naively, this suggests we should not propose any value for instances larger than i1; otherwise,
if the stop value is eventually decided at ii , we will violate the safety property that requires that no
value be decided after a stop command. However, it could be that for some i2 > i1, we also find
roundof(m, i2) , ⊥. Here we face a dilemma: if the stop value at i1 is eventually decided, proposing
at i2 may lead to a safety violation; but if the stop value at i1 is in fact not choosable and the value
at i2 is eventually decided, then re-proposing the stop value at i1 may lead to a safety violation too.
As explained in [Lamport et al. 2008], there is a way to ensure that either the stop value at i1 is
choosable or the other value at i2 is choosable, but not both, and to know which one is choosable.
The solution depends on whether roundof(m, i2) > roundof(m, i1), in which case the stop command
for i1 cannot be choosable and is voided by treating it as if roundof(m, i1) = ⊥. Otherwise, the value
at i2 cannot be choosable and the owner should propose the stop command for i1, and not propose
any other values for instances larger than i1.
The rule described in [Lamport et al. 2008] is to first compute which stop commands are voided,
and then to propose all commands except those made impossible by a non-voided stop command
(i.e., a non-voided stop command at a lower instance). Formalizing this introduces cyclic quantifier
alternation over instances, since the condition for voiding a stop command involves an existential
quantifier over instances. Formally, letmL denote the votemap obtained fromm by voiding according
to the rule of [Lamport et al. 2008] (where it is called sval2a).mL is given by:
∀i : instance. (valueof(mL, i) = valueof(m, i)) ∧ (φvoid → roundof(mL, i) = ⊥)∧
(¬φvoid → roundof(mL, i) = roundof(m, i))
where:
φvoid = ∃i ′ : instance. i ′ > i ∧ roundof(m, i ′) , ⊥ ∧ roundof(m, i ′) > roundof(m, i)
Then, the rule in [Lamport et al. 2008] makes proposals for instances i that satisfy the condition
condition:
roundof(mL, i) , ⊥ ∧ ∀i ′ : instance. i ′ < i ∧ valueof(mL, i ′) = stop→ roundof(mL, i ′) = ⊥
This introduces yet another quantifier alternation cycle, since it must be applied with universal
quantification to all instances.
To avoid this cyclic quantifier alternation, we observe that a relaxed rule can be used, and verify
a realization of Stoppable Paxos based on our relaxed rule. The relaxed rule avoids the quantifier
alternation, and it also provides an overapproximation of the rule of [Lamport et al. 2008]. The
relaxed rule is to first find the stop command with the highest round inm, and then check if it is
voided (by a value at a higher instance and higher round). If it is not voided, then we void all other
stop commands, and all proposals at higher instances. If the maximal stop is voided, we void all
stop commands, as well as all proposals with higher instances and lower rounds (compared to the
stop command with the highest round). This rule does not lead to any quantifie alternation cycles.
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1 sort node
2 sort quorum
3 sort round
4 sort value
5 sort instance
6 sort votemap
7
8 relation ≤r : round, round
9 relation ≤i : instance, instance
10 axiom total_order(≤r )
11 axiom total_order(≤i )
12 constant ⊥ : round
13 constant stop : instance
14 relation member : node, quorum
15 axiom ∀q1, q2 : quorum. ∃n : node. member(n, q1) ∧member(n, q2)
16
17 relation start_round_msg : round
18 relation join_ack_msg : node, round, votemap
19 relation propose_msg : instance, round, value
20 relation active : round
21 relation vote_msg : node, instance, round, value
22 relation decision : node, instance, round, value
23 function roundof : votemap, instance→ round
24 function valueof : votemap, instance→ value
25
26 init ∀r . ¬start_round_msg(r )
27 init ∀n, r,m . ¬join_ack_msg(n, r,m)
28 init ∀i, r, v . ¬propose_msg(i, r, v)
29 init ∀r . ¬active(r )
30 init ∀n, i, r, v . ¬vote_msg(n, i, r, v)
31 init ∀r, v . ¬decision(r, v)
32
33 action start_round # same as Multi−Paxos (Fig. 7 line 30)
34 action join_round # same as Multi−Paxos (Fig. 7 line 31)
35 action vote # same as Multi−Paxos (Fig. 7 line 52)
36 action learn # same as Multi−Paxos (Fig. 7 line 56)
37 action instate_round(r : round, q : quorum) {
38 assume r , ⊥ ∧ ¬active(r)
39 assume ∀n . member(n, q) → ∃m . join_ack_msg(n, r,m)
40 local m : votemap := ∗
41 assume ∀i . (roundof(m, i), valueof(m, i)) = max {(r ′, v ′) | ∃n,m′ . member(n, q) ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r,m′) ∧
42 r ′ = roundof(m′, i) ∧ v ′ = valueof(m′, i) ∧ r ′ , ⊥ }
43 active(r) := true
44 if (∀i .roundof(m, i) , ⊥ → valueof(m, i) , stop) { # no stops in m
45 propose_msg(I, r, V ) := propose_msg(I, r, V ) ∨ (roundof(m, I ) , ⊥ ∧V = valueof(m, I ))
46 } else { # find maximal stop in m and propose accordingly
47 local is : instance := ∗
48 assume roundof(m, is) , ⊥ ∧ valueof(m, is) = stop∧
49 ∀i . (roundof(m, i) , ⊥ ∧ valueof(m, i) = stop) → roundof(m, i) ≤r roundof(m, is)
50 if (∃i . i >i is ∧ roundof(m, i) , ⊥ ∧ roundof(m, i) >r roundof(m, is)) { # maximal stop is voided
51 propose_msg(I, r, V ) := propose_msg(I, r, V ) ∨ (roundof(m, I ) , ⊥ ∧V = valueof(m, I ) ∧V , stop∧
52 (I >i is → roundof(m, I ) >r roundof(m, is)))
53 } else { # maximal stop not voided
54 propose_msg(I, r, V ) := propose_msg(I, r, V ) ∨ (roundof(m, I ) , ⊥ ∧V = valueof(m, I ) ∧ I ≤i is ∧ (V = stop → I = is))
55 }
56 }
57 }
58 action propose_new_value(r : round, i : instance, v : value) {
59 assume r , ⊥ ∧ active(r) ∧ ∀v . ¬propose_msg(i, r, v)
60 assume ∀i . i ≤i i→ ¬propose_msg(i, r, stop))
61 assume v = stop → ∀i, v . i ≤i i → ¬propose_msg(i, r, v)
62 propose_msg(r, v) := true
63 }
Fig. 14. Model of Stoppable Paxos as a transition system in many-sorted first-order logic.47
A.4.1 Model of the Protocol. Our model of Stoppable Paxos in first-order logic appears in
Fig. 14. The only actions that differ from Multi-Paxos (Fig. 7) are instate_round and propose.
The rule described above is implemented in the instate_round action. Line 41 computesm as in
Multi-Paxos. Then, line 44 checks if there are any stop commands reported inm. If there are no
stop commands, then line 45 proposes exactly as in Multi-Paxos (Fig. 7 line 45). If there are stop
commands inm, then line 48 finds is, the instance of the stop command with the highest round
present inm. Line 50 then checks if this stop command is voided by a value present inm at a higher
instance and with a higher round. If so, then line 51 proposes all values fromm that are not stop
commands, excluding those which are voided by the stop at is, i.e., those at a higher instance and
lower round. In case the stop at is is not voided, line 54 proposes all non-stop commands until is, as
well as a stop at is, and does not propose anything for higher instances.
The propose action is similar to Multi-Paxos, but contains a few changes as described in [Lamport
et al. 2008]. First, we may not propose any value if we have proposed a stop command at a lower
instance (line 60). Second, we may only propose a stop value at an instance such that we have not
already proposed anything at higher instances (line 61).
Our rule for Stoppable Paxos provides an overapproximation of the rule of [Lamport et al. 2008],
in that it forces less proposals in the instate_round action. Thus, any behaviour of [Lamport
et al. 2008] can be simulated by an instate_round action followed by several propose actions to
produce the missing proposals. We have also verified this using IVy and Z3, albeit the verification
conditions were outside of EPR. Nevertheless, Z3 was able to verify this in under 2 seconds. This is
in contrast to verifying the inductive invariant for the version of [Lamport et al. 2008], for which
Z3 diverged.
A.4.2 Inductive Invariant. The inductive invariant for Stoppable Paxos contains the inductive
invariant for Multi-Paxos (Section 7.2), and in addition includes conjuncts that capture the special
meaning of stop commands, and ensure the additional safety property of eq. (65). Below we list
these additional conjuncts.
First, the inductive invariant asserts that a stop command proposed at some instance forbids
proposals of other commands in higher instances in the same round:
∀i1, i2 : instance, r : round,v : value. propose_msg(i1, r , stop) ∧ i2 >i i1 → ¬propose_msg(i2, r ,v) (66)
Next, the inductive invariant connects different rounds via the choosable concept (see Section 5.2,
eq. (12)). If any value is proposed, then stop command cannot be choosable at lower instances and
lower rounds:
∀i1, i2 : instance, r1, r2 : round,v : value,q : quorum. propose_msg(i2, r2,v) ∧ r1 <r r2 ∧ i1 <i i2 →
∃n : node, r ′, r ′′ : round,v ′ : value.
member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1, stop) ∧ r ′ > r1 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v ′)
(67)
And, in addition, if stop is proposed, than nothing can be choosable at lower rounds and higher
instances:
∀i1, i2 : instance, r1, r2 : round,v : value,q : quorum. propose_msg(i1, r2, stop) ∧ r1 <r r2 ∧ i1 <i i2 →
∃n : node, r ′, r ′′ : round,v ′ : value.
member(n,q) ∧ ¬vote_msg(n, r1,v) ∧ r ′ > r1 ∧ join_ack_msg(n, r ′, r ′′,v ′)
(68)
A.4.3 Transformation to EPR. The quantifier alternation structure of Fig. 14 and the inductive
invariant described above is the same as the one obtained for Multi-Paxos. Notice that eqs. (67)
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and (68) introduce a quantifier alternation cycle identical to the one introduced by eq. (19) for
Multi-Paxos (and by eq. (12) for single decree Paxos). Thus, the transformation of the Stoppable
Paxos model to EPR is identical to that of Multi-Paxos (Section 7.3), using the same derived relations
joined_round and left_round, when left_round is used to rewrite eqs. (67) and (68) in the inductive
invariant in the same way it was used in Section 6. This again shows the reusability of the derived
relations across many variants of Paxos.
B COMPARING THE EPR METHODOLOGYWITH INTERACTIVE THEOREM
PROVING
To compare the methodolgy presented in this paper with one based on an interactive proof assistant,
we proved the safety of a Paxos model almost identical to the IVy model in Isabelle/HOL (the
proof figures in appendix B.1 and is written for Isabelle-2016-1). Isabelle/HOL [Nipkow et al. 2002]
is an interactive theorem prover with a small trusted kernel that checks all inferences, and can
offload proof obligations to integrated automated provers or external SMT solvers whose proofs
are then automatically reconstructed and checked in Isabelle/HOL. The Isabelle/HOL model of
Paxos uses the theory of I/O-Automata [Lynch and Tuttle 1987] (we reuse an existing formalization)
and closely follows the IVy model, except that no encoding of higher-order concepts is needed in
Isabelle/HOL because its logic is a higher-order logic: we use natural numbers for rounds and sets
of nodes with cardinality constraints for quorums.
The Isabelle/HOL proof is structured as follows: We define an abstraction of the single-shot Paxos
model which we prove prove safe. This abstraction models the core of the Paxos algorithm, namely
how a node proposing a new command computes which command is choosable at rounds lower
than its round. The proof is facilitated by the high level of abstraction. Then, using a refinement
mapping, we prove that the Paxos specification implements the abstraction. The full proof of Paxos
consists of roughly 200 lines.
The proof process in Isabelle/HOL involves two steps: first writing a high-level proof skeleton
(including the definition of the abstraction, the refinement mapping, and all the invariants needed)
in which some proof steps are missing (e.g. that an invariant is inductive and that the refinement
mapping is correct). This proof skeleton is then debugged with the Nipick [Blanchette and Nipkow
2010] model-finder. When we are satisfied that our proof skeleton is correct, we turn to proving all
the steps left out.
The first step is similar to proving in IVy, except that instead of rewriting the model to make
it fall in EPR we built the abstraction and the proof skeleton. On our model of Paxos, the Nitpick
model-finder exhibits reliable performance and thus this step is comparable in difficulty to proving
with IVy, although the graphical user interface of IVy helps understand counterexample faster.
However, thanks to decidability of EPR, with IVy we are done at the end of this step.
In Isabelle/HOL, proving that the steps left out are correct is still a challenge. To do so, we may
have to refine our proof skeleton until all steps can be proved by the automated provers available
in Isabelle/HOL. This task can be time consuming and requires an experienced user who can gauge
what can be proved automatically and what not. Moreover, in refining the proof skeleton, one may
try to isolate facts relevant for a sub-proof, and mistakenly omit necessary assumptions. Therefore
the proof skeleton must continuously be debugged with the model-finder to ensure that the user
does not take a dead-end. The Isabelle/HOL proof is completed in about 200 lines of proof script.
One tricky aspect of the Isabelle/HOL proof is the proof that the propose action preserves eq. (12),
which is automatic with IVy. We reason as follows. To show that eq. (12) is maintained by the
propose action, assume it is not, i.e. that the owner p of r2 proposes v2 in r2, and that v1 , v2
is choosable at r1 < r2. Consider the highest round r3 reported by the quorum q′ of nodes that
acknowledged p’s start-round message, and the associated value v3. If r3 = ⊥, then no node in q′
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voted before r2. Therefore, for any quorum q, since q intersects q′, one node of q joined r2 > r1 and
did not vote in r1. Therefore v1 cannot be choosable in r1, a contradiction. Now assume r3 , ⊥.
This implies that v2 = v3. Consider the following three cases: either (a) r1 < r3, (b) r1 = r3, or (c)
r1 > r3. Assume (a), r1 < r3. Equation (6) implies that v3 was proposed at r3. Then by eq. (12) and
the fact that v1 is choosable at r1 < r3, we get that v1 = v3. With v2 = v3 we get that v1 = v2, a
contradiction. Assume (b), r1 = r3. Since v3 has been voted for at r3, the proposal at r3 is v3 and
only v3 can be choosable at r3. With v2 = v3 we get that v1 = v2, a contradiction. Finally, assume
(c), r1 > r3. We know that all node in q′ did not vote between r3 and r2. Therefore, for any quorum
q, since q intersects q′, one node of q joined r2 > r1 and did not vote in r1. Therefore v1 cannot be
choosable in r1, a contradiction. We have reached a contradiction in all cases.
Finally, we note that the EPR methodology could be implemented in a proof assistant like
Isabelle/HOL thanks to its “smt” method, which discharges proof obligations to SMT solvers and
reconstructs SMT proof in Isabelle/HOL’s logic.
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1 The Paxos I/O-Automaton
theory Paxos
imports Main Simulations ∼∼/src/HOL/Eisbach/Eisbach-Tools
begin
The theory Simulations is part of the I/O-Automata formalization found at
https://github.com/nano-o/IO-Automata
interpretation IOA .
datatype ′v paxos-action =
Internal | Decision ′v
We specify Paxos following the IVy FOL specification. Rounds are natural
numbers, and We use the round 0 to represent the round ⊥. We use the
type variable ′n for nodes and ′v for values.
definition paxos-asig where
paxos-asig ≡ (| inputs = {}, outputs = {Decision v | v . True}, internals =
{Internal} |)
record ( ′v , ′n) state =
start-round-msg :: nat set
join-ack-msg :: ( ′n × nat × nat × ′v) set
propose-msg :: (nat × ′v) set
vote-msg :: ( ′n × nat × ′v) set
decision :: (nat × ′v) set
locale paxos-ioa =
fixes quorums:: ′n set set
— We will make assumptions on quorums only in the correctness proof.
begin
definition start where
— The initial state
start ≡ {(| start-round-msg = {}, join-ack-msg = {}, propose-msg = {},
vote-msg = {}, decision = {} |)}
definition start-round where
start-round r s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ s ′ = s(|start-round-msg := start-round-msg s ∪ {r}|)
definition join-round where
join-round n r maxr maxv s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ r ∈ start-round-msg s ∧
(∀ r ′ ≥ r . ∀ r ′′ v . (n, r ′, r ′′, v) /∈ join-ack-msg s) ∧
((maxr = 0 ∧ (∀ r ′ v . r ′ < r −→ (n, r ′, v) /∈ vote-msg s)) ∨
(maxr 6= 0 ∧ maxr < r ∧ (n, maxr , maxv) ∈ vote-msg s
∧ (∀ r ′ v . r ′ < r ∧ (n, r ′, v) ∈ vote-msg s −→ r ′ ≤ maxr))) ∧
s ′ = s(|join-ack-msg := join-ack-msg s ∪ {(n, r , maxr , maxv)}|)
B.1 Safety Proof of Paxos in Isabelle/HOL
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definition propose where
propose r q v s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ (∀ v . (r , v) /∈ propose-msg s) ∧ q ∈ quorums ∧
(∀ n ∈ q . ∃ maxr maxv . (n, r , maxr , maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s) ∧
(∃ n maxr maxv . (n, r , maxr , maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s ∧
(∀ n ′ r maxr ′ maxv ′ . n ′ ∈ q ∧ (n ′, r , maxr ′, maxv ′) ∈ join-ack-msg s −→
maxr ′ ≤ maxr) ∧
(maxr = 0 ∨ v = maxv) ∧
s ′ = s(|propose-msg := propose-msg s ∪ {(r , v)}|))
definition vote where
vote n r v s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ (r , v) ∈ propose-msg s ∧
(∀ r ′ maxr maxv . r ′ > r −→ (n, r ′, maxr , maxv) /∈ join-ack-msg s) ∧
(∃ maxr maxv . (n,r ,maxr ,maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s) ∧
s ′ = s(|vote-msg := vote-msg s ∪ {(n, r , v)}|)
definition decide where
decide r v q s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ q ∈ quorums ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . (n, r , v) ∈ vote-msg s) ∧
s ′ = s(|decision := decision s ∪ {(r , v)}|)
fun trans-rel :: ( ′v , ′n) state ⇒ ′v paxos-action ⇒ ( ′v , ′n) state ⇒ bool where
trans-rel s Internal s ′ = (
(∃ r . start-round r s s ′) ∨
(∃ n r maxr maxv . join-round n r maxr maxv s s ′) ∨
(∃ r q v . propose r q v s s ′) ∨
(∃ n r v . vote n r v s s ′) ) |
trans-rel s (Decision v) s ′ = (∃ r q . decide r v q s s ′)
definition trans where
trans ≡ { (s,a,s ′) . trans-rel s a s ′}
definition paxos-ioa where
paxos-ioa ≡ (|ioa.asig = paxos-asig , start = start , trans = trans|)
lemmas simps = paxos-ioa-def paxos-asig-def start-def start-round-def trans-def
propose-def join-round-def
vote-def decide-def
end
2 The Abstract Paxos I/O-automaton
record ( ′v , ′n) abstract-state =
votes :: ( ′n × nat × ′v) set
joined-round :: ( ′n × nat) set
proposal :: (nat × ′v) set
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decision :: (nat × ′v) set
locale abstract-paxos-ioa =
fixes quorums:: ′n set set
begin
definition start where
— The initial state
start ≡ {(| votes = {}, joined-round = {}, proposal = {}, decision = {} |)}
definition vote where
vote n r v s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ (r , v) ∈ proposal s ∧ (∀ r ′ > r . (n, r ′) /∈ joined-round s) ∧
(n, r) ∈ joined-round s ∧ s ′ = s(|votes := (votes s) ∪ {(n, r , v)}|)
definition join-round where
join-round n r s s ′ ≡
(∀ r ′ ≥ r . (n, r ′) /∈ joined-round s) ∧ s ′ = s(|joined-round := (joined-round
s) ∪ {(n, r)}|)
definition propose where
propose r q v s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ q ∈ quorums ∧
(∀ v . (r , v) /∈ proposal s) ∧
(∀ n ∈ q . (n, r) ∈ joined-round s) ∧
(∃ maxr maxn . maxr < r ∧
((maxr = 0 ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes s)) ∨
(maxr 6= 0 ∧ (maxn, maxr , v) ∈ votes s ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v .
(n, r ′, v) ∈ votes s −→ r ′ ≤ maxr)))) ∧
s ′ = s(|proposal := (proposal s) ∪ {(r ,v)}|)
definition decide where
decide r v s s ′ ≡
r 6= 0 ∧ (∃ q ∈ quorums . ∀ n ∈ q . (n, r , v) ∈ votes s) ∧
s ′ = s(|decision := decision s ∪ {(r , v)}|)
fun trans-rel :: ( ′v , ′n) abstract-state ⇒ ′v paxos-action ⇒ ( ′v , ′n) abstract-state
⇒ bool where
trans-rel s Internal s ′ = (
(∃ n r . join-round n r s s ′) ∨
(∃ r q v . propose r q v s s ′) ∨
(∃ n r v . vote n r v s s ′)) |
trans-rel s (Decision v) s ′ = (∃ r . decide r v s s ′)
definition trans where
trans ≡ { (s,a,s ′) . trans-rel s a s ′}
definition abstract-paxos-ioa :: (( ′v , ′n) abstract-state, ′v paxos-action) ioa where
abstract-paxos-ioa ≡ (|ioa.asig = paxos-asig , start = start , trans = trans|)
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3 Proof Automation setup
A very simple verification-condition generator for proving invariants, that
unfolds definitions and inserts proved invariants as premises.
named-theorems invs named-theorems inv-defs named-theorems ioa-defs
method rm-reachable = (match premises in R[thin]:reachable ?ioa ?s ⇒ 〈−〉)
lemma reach-and-inv-imp-p:[[reachable ioa s; invariant ioa i ]] =⇒ i s
by (auto simp add :invariant-def )
method instantiate-invs declares invs =
(match premises in I [thin]:invariant ?ioa ?inv and R:reachable ?ioa ?s ⇒ 〈
print-fact I , insert reach-and-inv-imp-p[OF R I ]〉)+
method inv-vcg declares invs ioa-defs inv-defs = (
rule invariantI ,
force simp add :ioa-defs inv-defs,
(insert invs, instantiate-invs)? , rm-reachable, simp add :ioa-defs)
locale paxos-proof = abs:abstract-paxos-ioa quorums + paxos-ioa quorums
for quorums :: ′n set set +
fixes abs-ioa :: (( ′v , ′n) abstract-state, ′v paxos-action) ioa
and con-ioa :: (( ′v , ′n) state, ′v paxos-action) ioa
defines abs-ioa ≡ abs.abstract-paxos-ioa and con-ioa ≡ paxos-ioa
assumes
∧
q1 q2 . [[q1 ∈ quorums; q2 ∈ quorums]] =⇒ q1 ∩ q2 6= {}
and quorums 6= {} and ∧ q . q ∈ quorums =⇒ finite q
and finite quorums
begin
lemma quorum-inter-witness[elim]:
assumes q1 ∈ quorums and q2 ∈ quorums
obtains a where a ∈ q1 and a ∈ q2
using assms paxos-proof-axioms
by (metis disjoint-iff-not-equal paxos-proof-def )
lemmas asig-simps = externals-def abs.abstract-paxos-ioa-def paxos-asig-def con-ioa-def
abs-ioa-def paxos-ioa-def
lemmas trans-simps = con-ioa-def paxos-ioa-def start-def abs-ioa-def abs.abstract-paxos-ioa-def
abs.start-def
is-trans-def trans-def abs.trans-def
lemmas act-defs = abs.propose-def abs.join-round-def abs.vote-def abs.decide-def
vote-def start-round-def join-round-def decide-def propose-def
declare trans-simps[ioa-defs]
54
4 Proof of Abstract Paxos
definition safety where safety-def [inv-defs]:
safety s ≡ ∀ v v ′ r r ′ . (r ,v) ∈ decision s ∧ (r ′,v ′) ∈ decision s −→ v = v ′
definition invariant-1 where invariant-1-def [inv-defs]:
invariant-1 s ≡ (∀ n r v . (n, r , v) ∈ votes s −→ (r , v) ∈ proposal s)
∧ (∀ r v v ′ . (r , v) ∈ proposal s ∧ (r , v ′) ∈ proposal s −→ v = v ′)
definition choosable where
choosable s r v ≡ ∃ q ∈ quorums . ∀ n ∈ q .
(∃ r ′ > r . (n, r ′) ∈ joined-round s) −→ (n, r , v) ∈ votes s
definition invariant-2 where invariant-2-def [inv-defs]:
invariant-2 s ≡ ∀ r r ′ v v ′ . r ′ < r ∧ (r , v) ∈ proposal s ∧
choosable s r ′ v ′ −→ v = v ′
definition invariant-3 where invariant-3-def [inv-defs]:
invariant-3 s ≡ ∀ v r . (r ,v) ∈ decision s −→ (∃ q ∈ quorums . ∀ n ∈ q . (n,
r , v) ∈ votes s)
declare act-defs[simp]
lemma abs-trans-cases:
— A case split rule for analyzing the transition relation by cases
assumes abs.trans-rel s a s ′
obtains
(abs-join-round) n r where abs.join-round n r s s ′ and a = Internal |
(abs-propose) r q v where abs.propose r q v s s ′ and a = Internal |
(abs-vote) n r v where abs.vote n r v s s ′ and a = Internal |
(abs-decide) r v where abs.decide r v s s ′ and a = Decision v
by (meson abstract-paxos-ioa.trans-rel .elims(2 ) assms)
lemma invariant-1 :
invariant abs-ioa invariant-1
apply (inv-vcg , elim abs-trans-cases)
apply (auto simp add :inv-defs)
done
declare invariant-1 [invs]
lemma invariant-2 :
invariant abs-ioa invariant-2
apply (inv-vcg)
subgoal premises prems for s s ′ a using prems(2 )
proof (cases rule:abs-trans-cases)
case (abs-join-round n r)
have votes s ′ = votes s
and
∧
n r . (n, r) ∈ joined-round s =⇒ (n,r) ∈ joined-round s ′
and proposal s ′ = proposal s using abs-join-round by simp-all
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thus ?thesis using prems(1 ) apply (auto simp add :invariant-2-def choosable-def )
by meson
next
case (abs-propose r q v)
have votes s ′ = votes s and joined-round s ′ = joined-round s
and proposal s ′ = (proposal s) ∪ {(r ,v)}
using abs-propose by auto
moreover
have v ′ = v if r ′ < r and choosable s r ′ v ′ for v ′ r ′
proof −
have q-joined :∀ n ∈ q . (n,r) ∈ joined-round s and q ∈ quorums using
abs-propose
by simp-all
obtain rmax n where q ∈ quorums and rmax < r
(rmax = 0 ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes s))
∨ (rmax 6= 0 ∧ (n, rmax , v) ∈ votes s
∧ (∀ n ′ ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n ′, r ′, v) ∈ votes s −→ r ′ ≤ rmax ))
using abs-propose by auto
with this consider
(no-votes) rmax = 0 and ∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes s |
(votes) rmax 6= 0 and (n, rmax , v) ∈ votes s
and ∀ n ′ ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n ′, r ′, v) ∈ votes s −→ r ′ ≤ rmax by
auto
thus ?thesis
proof (cases)
case no-votes
hence False using q-joined that 〈q ∈ quorums〉 apply (auto simp add :choosable-def )
by (meson quorum-inter-witness)
thus ?thesis by auto
next
case votes
from 〈choosable s r ′ v ′〉 obtain n ′ where (n ′, r ′, v ′) ∈ votes s
using 〈q ∈ quorums〉 〈r ′ < r 〉 q-joined by (force simp add :choosable-def )
consider (a) r ′ < rmax | (b) r ′ = rmax | (c) r ′ > rmax
using nat-neq-iff by blast
then show ?thesis
proof (cases)
case a
with prems(1 ,3 ) votes(2 ) that(2 ) 〈rmax < r 〉 show ?thesis
by (auto simp add :invariant-2-def invariant-1-def , blast)
next
case b
from 〈choosable s r ′ v ′〉 obtain n ′ where ( n ′, r ′, v ′) ∈ votes s
using 〈q ∈ quorums〉 〈r ′ < r 〉 q-joined by (force simp add :choosable-def )
with prems(3 ) votes(2 ) b show ?thesis by (force simp add :invariant-1-def
split :option.splits)
next
case c
hence ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes s if n ∈ q for n
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using votes(3 ) that 〈r ′ < r 〉 by force
with 〈choosable s r ′ v ′〉 〈q ∈ quorums〉 q-joined 〈r ′ < r 〉 have False by
(force simp add :choosable-def )
thus ?thesis by auto
qed
qed
qed
ultimately show ?thesis using prems(1 ) apply (auto simp add :invariant-2-def
choosable-def )
by (blast , meson)
next
case (abs-vote n r v)
have joined-round s ′ = joined-round s and proposal s ′ = proposal s
and
∧
n r v . (n, r , v) ∈ votes s ′ ∧ (n, r , v) /∈ votes s −→
((n, r) ∈ joined-round s ∧ (∀ r ′ > r . (n, r ′) /∈ joined-round s)) using
abs-vote by auto
thus ?thesis using prems(1 ) prems(2 ) apply (auto simp add :invariant-2-def
invariant-1-def choosable-def )
by meson
next
case (abs-decide r v)
then show ?thesis using prems(1 ) by (auto simp add :invariant-2-def choosable-def )
qed
done
declare invariant-2 [invs]
lemma invariant-3 :
invariant abs-ioa invariant-3
apply (inv-vcg , elim abs-trans-cases)
apply (simp-all add :inv-defs)
apply metis
done
declare invariant-3 [invs]
theorem safety :
invariant abs-ioa safety
proof −
have safety s if invariant-3 s and invariant-2 s and invariant-1 s for s using
that
apply (auto simp add :inv-defs choosable-def )
by (metis not-less-iff-gr-or-eq quorum-inter-witness)
thus ?thesis
using IOA.invariant-def invariant-1 invariant-2 invariant-3 by blast
qed
declare invariant-1 [invs del ] invariant-2 [invs del ] invariant-3 [invs del ]
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5 Proof of Paxos by refinement to abstract paxos.
definition invariant-4 where invariant-4-def [inv-defs]:
invariant-4 s ≡ ∀ n r maxr maxv . (n, r , maxr , maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s ∧ maxr
6= 0
−→ (maxr < r ∧ (n, maxr , maxv) ∈ vote-msg s ∧ (∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v)
∈ vote-msg s −→ r ′ ≤ maxr))
definition invariant-5 where invariant-5-def [inv-defs]:
invariant-5 s ≡ ∀ n r maxr maxv . (n, r , maxr , maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s ∧ maxr
= 0
−→ (∀ r ′ v . r ′ < r −→ (n, r ′, v) /∈ vote-msg s)
lemma trans-cases:
— A case split rule for analyzing the transition relation by cases
assumes trans-rel s a s ′
obtains
(start-round) r where start-round r s s ′ and a = Internal |
(join-round) n r maxr maxv where join-round n r maxr maxv s s ′ and a =
Internal |
(propose) r q v where propose r q v s s ′ and a = Internal |
(vote) n r v where vote n r v s s ′ and a = Internal |
(decide) r v q where decide r v q s s ′ and a = Decision v
by (meson assms trans-rel .elims(2 ))
lemma invariant-4 :
invariant con-ioa invariant-4
apply (inv-vcg , elim trans-cases)
apply (force simp add :inv-defs)
apply (simp add :inv-defs) apply blast
apply (simp add :inv-defs) apply force
apply (simp add :inv-defs) apply blast
apply (simp add :inv-defs)
done
declare invariant-4 [invs]
lemma invariant-5 :
invariant con-ioa invariant-5
apply (inv-vcg , elim trans-cases)
apply (force simp add :inv-defs) defer
apply (simp add :inv-defs)
apply (metis state.select-convs(2 ) state.select-convs(4 ) state.surjective state.update-convs(3 ))
apply (force simp add :inv-defs)
apply (force simp add :inv-defs)
apply (simp add :inv-defs) apply blast
done
declare invariant-5 [invs]
declare act-defs[simp del ]
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definition ref-map where
ref-map s ≡ (|votes = vote-msg s, joined-round = {(n,r) . ∃ r ′ v . (n,r ,r ′,v) ∈
join-ack-msg s},
proposal = propose-msg s, decision = state.decision s|)
lemmas ref-proof-simps = ref-map-def asig-simps trans-simps trace-def schedule-def
filter-act-def
lemma refinement :
shows is-ref-map ref-map con-ioa abs-ioa
apply (auto simp add :is-ref-map-def )
apply (simp add :ref-map-def ioa-defs)
apply (insert invs)
apply (instantiate-invs)
apply (simp add :trans-simps refines-def trace-match-def )
subgoal premises prems for s t a using prems(2 )
proof (induct rule:trans-cases)
case (start-round r)
then show ?case
apply (intro exI [where x=[]])
apply (auto simp add :ref-proof-simps start-round-def )
done
next
case (join-round n r maxr maxv)
let ?s ′ = ref-map s
let ?t ′ = (ref-map s)(|joined-round := joined-round (ref-map s) ∪ {(n,r)}|)
have abs.join-round n r ?s ′ ?t ′ using join-round(1 )
by (auto simp add :join-round-def abs.join-round-def ref-map-def )
moreover
have ref-map t = ?t ′ using join-round(1 ) by (auto simp add :join-round-def
ref-map-def )
ultimately show ?case using join-round(2 )
apply (intro exI [where x=[(Internal , ?t ′)]])
apply (auto simp add :ref-proof-simps)
done
next
case (propose r q v)
let ?s ′ = ref-map s
let ?t ′ = (ref-map s)(|proposal := proposal (ref-map s) ∪ {(r ,v)}|)
have abs.propose r q v ?s ′ ?t ′
proof −
obtain n maxr maxv where con-pre:r 6= 0 ∧ (∀ v . (r , v) /∈ propose-msg s)
∧ q ∈ quorums ∧
(∀ n ′ ∈ q . ∃ maxr maxv . (n ′,r ,maxr ,maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s)
∧ (n, r , maxr , maxv) ∈ join-ack-msg s ∧
(∀ n ′ r maxr ′ maxv ′ . n ′ ∈ q ∧ (n ′, r , maxr ′, maxv ′) ∈ join-ack-msg s
−→ maxr ′ ≤ maxr) ∧
(maxr = 0 ∨ v = maxv) using propose(1 ) by (auto simp add :propose-def )
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have r 6= 0 ∧ q ∈ quorums ∧ (∀ v . (r , v) /∈ proposal ?s ′) ∧
(∀ n ∈ q . (n, r) ∈ joined-round ?s ′) using con-pre by (auto simp
add :ref-map-def )
moreover have
maxr < r ∧ ((maxr = 0 ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes
?s ′)) ∨
(maxr 6= 0 ∧ (n, maxr , v) ∈ votes ?s ′ ∧ (∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v .
(n, r ′, v) ∈ votes ?s ′ −→ r ′ ≤ maxr)))
proof −
show ?thesis
proof (cases maxr = 0 )
case True
hence ∀ n ∈ q . ∀ r ′ < r . ∀ v . (n, r ′, v) /∈ votes ?s ′ and r>0 using
prems(4 ) con-pre
apply (simp-all add :ref-map-def invariant-5-def ) by blast
thus ?thesis using True by auto
next
case False
then show ?thesis using prems(3 ,4 ) con-pre
apply (auto simp add :ref-map-def invariant-5-def invariant-4-def )
subgoal — Proof automatically generated by Sledgehammer done
qed
qed
moreover have ?t ′ = ?s ′(|proposal := (proposal ?s ′) ∪ {(r ,v)}|)
by (auto simp add :ref-map-def )
ultimately show ?thesis by (auto simp add :abs.propose-def )
qed
moreover
have ref-map t = ?t ′ using propose(1 ) by (auto simp add :propose-def ref-map-def )
ultimately show ?case using propose(2 )
apply (intro exI [where x=[(Internal , ?t ′)]])
apply (auto simp add : ref-proof-simps)
done
next
case (vote n r v)
let ?s ′ = ref-map s
let ?t ′ = (ref-map s)(|votes := votes (ref-map s) ∪ {(n,r ,v)}|)
have abs.vote n r v ?s ′ ?t ′
proof −
from vote(1 ) have r 6= 0 ∧ (r , v) ∈ proposal ?s ′ ∧ (∀ r ′ > r . (n, r ′) /∈
joined-round ?s ′) ∧
(n, r) ∈ joined-round ?s ′
by (auto simp add :vote-def ref-map-def )
moreover
from vote(1 ) have ?t ′ = ?s ′(|votes := (votes ?s ′) ∪ {(n, r , v)}|)
by (auto simp add :vote-def ref-map-def )
ultimately show ?thesis by (auto simp add :abs.vote-def )
qed
moreover have ref-map t = ?t ′ using vote(1 ) by (auto simp add :vote-def
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ref-map-def )
ultimately show ?case using vote(2 )
apply (intro exI [where x=[(Internal ,
(ref-map s)(|votes := votes (ref-map s) ∪ {(n,r ,v)}|))]])
apply (auto simp add :ref-proof-simps)
done
next
case (decide r v q)
then show ?case
apply (intro exI [where x=[(Decision v ,
(ref-map s)(|decision := decision (ref-map s) ∪ {(r ,v)}|))]])
apply (auto simp add :ref-proof-simps act-defs)
done
qed
done
theorem trace-inclusion:
traces con-ioa ⊆ traces abs-ioa
proof −
have externals (ioa.asig con-ioa) = externals (ioa.asig abs-ioa)
by (simp add :asig-simps)
thus ?thesis using refinement ref-map-soundness
by blast
qed
end
end
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